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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)(j)

(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue:

Whether the trial court correctly granted a

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claims of two federal
retirees when it held that the federal doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity does not require that Utah
provide a tax exemption to federal retirees to compensate
for a pension increase given to state retirees?
Standard of Review: When reviewing dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), the court accepts "the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider[s] them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff.''

St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).

The

ruling is a question of law that is given no deference and
is reviewed under a correctness standard.

Id.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law is set forth verbatim in Addendum
(A) to the brief.

It is:

1

1.

4 U.S.C. § 111; and

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This is a review of an order granting dismissal under
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of a complaint asking for a tax
exemption for federal retirees claiming that a 1989 pension
increase for state retirees discriminates against federal
retirees under the federal doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity.
Course of Proceedings
This case began when Plaintiff Richard Thompson filed a
claim for income tax refund for 1999 and 2000 and an amended
tax return on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, claiming that a pension increase given to state
retirees in 1989 was a violation of the federal doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

(R. 74-80.)

Plaintiff Paul

Jensen filed similar documents.

(R. 89-94.)

These claims

were denied by the Taxpayer Services Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission; it notified Plaintiffs of the
opportunity to file a petition for redetermination with the
Utah State Tax Commission to challenge the action of the

2

Taxpayer Services Division.

(R. 81-84, 95-98.)

Plaintiffs did not file a petition for redetermination,
but instead filed a complaint in the district court.
8.)

(R. 1-

The complaint was brought pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.

23 on behalf of the named plaintiffs and a proposed class.
(R. 3.) It sought certification of a class consisting of
all persons and estates of deceased
persons who participated in a federal
retirement system prior to January 1,
1989, who have received retirement
benefits from the Federal Government that
were subject to the State's income Tax,
and who paid income tax to the State in
the years 1999 and 2000 but who failed to
receive the rebate provided to retirees
from the State pursuant to section 49-1701 of the Utah Code.
(R. 3.)

The complaint alleged that the Tax Commission had

refused to grant refunds.

(R. at f 30.)

Plaintiffs sought

a declaratory judgment and refunds on the basis that a 1989
pension increase to state retirees discriminated against
federal retirees pursuant to the doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

(R. 5-7.)

Plaintiffs also

sought injunctive relief barring the Tax Commission from
further taxation of the retirement benefits of federal
retirees.

(R. 7-8.)

The Tax Commission moved to dismiss because there was

3

no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claims.

(R. 43-50.)

It also

argued that the State Retirement Board should be joined as a
party.

(R. 50-52.)

The Commission further argued that

these claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity on two separate theories: (1) the State of Utah had
not waived its sovereign immunity for income tax refund
actions m

state court; and, (2) Utah had not waived its

sovereign immunity to allow for tax actions on behalf of a
class.

(R. 52-61.)

Finally, it argued that Plaintiffs had

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
67.)

(R. 62-

After a hearing on this motion, the district court

ordered joinder of the State Retirement Board and allowed it
to "weigh in" on the pending motion.

(R. 229-232.)

Aftei hearing from the State Retirement Board, and
allowing all parties an opportunity to address those
arguments, the district court granted the motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on
the basis that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for
which reljef could be granted.

(R. 346-354.)

In view of that ruling, the district court decided it
"need not reach the other arguments advanced by Defendants
in aid of their motion."

(R. 353.)

4

Disposition Below
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint
based on a holding that Plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted because Utah's 1989
pension increase to state retirees did not discriminate
against federal retirees under the doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

(R. 346-354.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts are contained in Plaintiffs'
Complaint.

They allege that Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701

(1998) provides for a discriminatory tax rebate to state
retirees and they requested a tax exemption for federal
retirees.

The relevant portions of the Complaint are:
*

* *

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment: Refund of Overpayment of Tax)
*

* *

20. The Legislature of the State of Utah recognized
the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis and
revoked the State income tax exemption for retirement
benefits received by retired employees of the State under
the State's retirement system.
21. Shortly after revoking the exemption, the
Legislature, in a 1989 special session held soon after Davis
was decided, enacted a rebate of somewhat less than one half
of the income tax burden imposed on the State retirement
5

income of individuals who were members of the State
Retirement System before January 1, 1989.
*

* *

24. This rebate is codified in section 49-1-701 of the
Utah Code and is provided by increasing by three percent
(3%) the retirement allowance of those members of the Utah
State Retirement System whose benefits became taxable as a
result of the Davis decision.
25. The Legislature failed to enact any rebate for
individuals such as Plaintiffs and Class Members who
participate in Federal Retirement Systems and who receive
benefits from those systems.
26. The retirement income of Plaintiffs and Class
Members is therefore subject to an impermissible
discriminatory tax--a tax that is imposed on Plaintiffs' and
Class Members retirement income but not on the retirement
income of certain members of the State Retirement System to
the extent they receive a rebate.
~k

-k

~k

31. The principal issue in this case is whether the
Legislature's enactment of section 49-1-701 of the Utah Code
to provide a rebate to State retirees constitutes
discrimination prohibited by the United States Constitution
and 4 U.S.C. § 111. This legal issue cannot be resolved in
the State Tax Commission's administrative proceedings.
32. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the
tax imposed upon them is illegal in violation of the United
States Constitution and 4 U.S.C. § 111 and that Plaintiffs
are entitled to a refund of the illegal tax imposed in the
amount of the rebate granted to members of the State
Retirement Fund but not granted to recipients of retirement
funds from the Federal Government.

6

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Injunctive Relief)
33. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 as set forth above.
34. Plaintiffs request a permanent injunction
enjoining Defendants from taxing the retirement benefits of
Plaintiffs and Class Members in a discriminatory manner.
Specifically, the State should be enjoined from taxing any
federal retirement benefits received by Plaintiffs and Class
Members.
(R. 5-7.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court assumed jurisdiction over a narrow
declaratory action bringing a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a pension statute.

This is consistent

with this Court's most recent decision on subject matter
jurisdiction.

Critical to accepting jurisdiction is a

determination that there is no other possible way to avoid
the narrow facial challenge.

If this Court disagrees with

the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim,
it should remand to address the other issues raised in the
Commission's motion to dismiss.
The Court should sustain the decision below dismissing
Mr. Thompson's and Mr. Jensen's complaint seeking a tax
exemption for federal retirees.

7

In 1989, following the U.S.

Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803
(1989), the Utah Legislature revoked the tax exemption for
state retirees that was alleged to violate the federal
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

That

legislative act brought Utah into compliance with federal
law.

Utah is still in full compliance with federal law

because federal retirees and state retirees are taxed
identically.
The majority opinion in Davis established that a
pension increase to state retirees does not violate
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

It addressed a dissenting

opinion by pointing out that Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
is violated when the state enacts tax laws to benefit itself
by discriminating against the federal government; however,
if the state were to raise pensions, Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity would not be violated.

In this case, the federal

treasury is benefitted by Utah's revocation of the 1989 tax
exemption to state retirees.
The trial court reviewed challenges to legislative
responses to Davis.

One such decision relied on by the

trial court as persuasive was Almeter v. Virginia Department
of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), cert, refused, No.

8

010270, Va. (April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 889,
122 S.Ct. 202 (mem)(Oct. 1, 2001)(R. 49), a trial Court
decision that both the United States and Virginia Supreme
Courts have allowed to stand by refusing to exercise their
discretionary review powers.
The rationale that the Almeter court relied on was that
"In Davis, both the majority and minority opinion recognized
that a state's response to the court's holding might be . .
. to pay extra money to state retirees to make up for what
those retirees lost as a result of being taxed."

id. at 2.

ARGUMENT
Jurisdictional Background
The district court's ruling implied that it assumed
jurisdiction over the declaratory action portion of the
complaint.

The narrow legal question presented by the

declaratory action was whether Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701, a
pension statute, violated the federal constitutional and
statutory doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity on its
face.

(R. 7, 1 31.)

It held on this question, that

"Plaintiffs' claims must fail as a matter of law. . . ."
(R. 365.)
District Court jurisdiction on a declaratory action of

9

a narrow facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
pension statute is consistent with this Court's most recent
decision on the subject matter jurisdiction.

Critical to

accepting jurisdiction is a determination that there is no
other possible way to avoid the narrow facial challenge.
Nebeker holds that exhaustion is required except under
"unusual circumstances."
UT 74, ff

Nebeker v. Tax Commission, 2001

14, 16, 34 P.3d 180; see also Brumlev v. Tax

Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) (holding that district
court had subject matter jurisdiction because threshold
legal questions could not realistically be avoided by "any
turn the case might have taken in the Commission").
This case involves two claims that have at their core a
federal constitutional facial challenge to a state pension
statute.

As stated in their complaint, the "principal issue

in this case is whether the Legislature's enactment of
section 49-1-701 of the Utah Code to provide a rebate to
State retirees constitutes discrimination prohibited by the
United States Constitution and 4 U.S.C. § 111."

(R. 7, I

31.) This threshold constitutional question could not be
avoided "by any turn the case may have taken at the
commission," Brumley at 799, nor were there other claims

10

which may have obviated the need to address the
constitutional question.

Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, (existence of

other than constitutional claims may obviate the need to
address the constitutional question).
Although the Commission challenged the jurisdiction of
the court below and raised other defenses to Plaintiffs'
claims going forward, see Statement of the Case above, Judge
Nehring addressed no other aspect of the case except the
narrow federal legal question.

He stated that the court

"need not reach the other arguments advanced by Defendants
in aid of their motion."

(R. 365.)

The Commission does not abandon the arguments raised as
being applicable to issues other than that addressed by the
court's declaratory ruling. However, the court's holding
obviated the need for a ruling on the other issues raised by
the Commission in its motion.

(R. 37-68.) The district

court thus properly avoided addressing all issues that are
exclusively within the original jurisdiction of the Tax
Commission.

See Brumley v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799

(Utah 1993) (court resolved the threshold legal question,
but did not interfere "with the core prerogatives of the
Commission"); see also Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, 11 16-17.
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If this Court disagrees with the district court's
dismissal for failure to state a claim, it should remand to
address the other issues raised in the Commission's motion
to dismiss.

These other defenses are set forth in the

Statement of the Case section of this brief and were fully
argued before the district court.

One of the included

defenses was whether refund claims, brought directly in the
district court, are barred by sovereign immunity.
Because of the complexity and reoccurring question on
the allocation of jurisdiction between the Commission and
the district court, the Commission urges the Court to be
express in its opinion that it is not holding that the
jurisdiction of the district court is broader than that
announced in Nebeker, but is solely addressing the narrow
issue present herein.
Introduction on the Merits
The Court should sustain the decision below dismissing
Mr. Thompson's and Mr. Jensen's complaint seeking a tax
exemption for federal retirees.

The basis of their

Complaint is a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Davis v.
Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), that held that a state may
not exempt the income of state retirees while taxing the

12

income of federal retirees because such discrimination
violates the federal doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity.
Following Davis, in 1989, the Utah Legislature revoked
the tax exemption for state retirees.

That legislative act

brought Utah into compliance with Davis for all years
subsequent to 1989, including the 1999 and 2000 years at
issue in this

case.

This Court resolved the pre-1989 Davis

issues with its decision in Brumley v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d
796 (Utah 1993).

As a result of Davis and Brumley,

Utah

taxpayers paid tens of millions of dollars in settlement of
income tax claims brought by federal retirees.

(1993 Utah

Laws 2nd Sp. Sess. Ch. 2, H.B. No. 8.)
This case is an effort to undo the 1989 legislation and
the Brumley decision that resolved Utah's Davis related
issues.

In 1989, the Legislature also increased retirement

pay to some state retirees.

Now, fourteen years later, Mr.

Thompson and Mr. Jensen claim that the increase in
retirement pay to state retirees, in 1989, violated the
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

However, what

they are asking the Court to do is create a tax exemption
for them that is unavailable to state retirees or anyone

13

else.
DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE UTAH HAS IMPLEMENTED THE
DAVIS DECISION.
A.

Davis Expressly Allows A State Pension
Increase.
1.

Utah Complied With The Requirements Of The
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine
When It Revoked The Income Tax Exemption
For State Retirees 14 Years Ago.

Utah has already complied with Davis v. Michigan.
Davis, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), which held that a state could
remedy a violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 "either by extending
the tax exemption to retired federal employees (or to all
retired employees), or by eliminating the exemption for
retired state and local government employees. . . ."

Davis,

489 U.S. at 818.
"The [Utah] legislature responded [to Davis] on
September 19, 1989, by making state retirement income as
well as federal retirement income taxable, effective January
1, 1989.

1989 Utah Laws Ch. 7, 2nd Special Session."

Brumlev v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1993).

At

that point, Utah had fully complied with Davis for tax years
after 1989, including the 1999 and 2000 years in dispute
here.

This equal treatment of retirement income, regardless

of source, remains the same today.
14

2.

Davis Expressly Said That A State Could
Raise The Compensation Of Its Retirees.

The majority opinion in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803
(1989), established that a pension increase to state
retirees does not violate Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.
The federal statute at issue in Davis provides:
The United States consents to the taxation
of pay or compensation for personal
service as an officer or employee of the
United States . . . by a duly constituted
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if
the taxation does not discriminate against
the officer or employee because of the
source of the pay or compensation.
4 U.S.C. § 111 (1997)(emphasis added).

This statute

addresses taxation, not pensions.
The majority in Davis expressly validated a pension
increase due to removal of an exemption for state employees.
It addressed a dissenting opinion by pointing out that
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity is violated when the state
enacts tax laws to benefit itself by discriminating against
the federal government; however, if the state were to raise
pensions, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity would not be
violated:
We also take issue with the dissent's
assertion that Nit is peculiarly
inappropriate to focus solely on the
treatment of state governmental employees'
15

because x[t]he State may always compensate
in pay or salary for what it assessed in
taxes.' Post,
at 1512. In order to provide
the same after-tax benefits to all retired
state employees by means of increased
salaries or benefit payments instead of a
tax exemption, the state would have to
increase its outlays by more than the cost
of the current tax exemption, since the
increased payments to retirees would
result in higher federal income tax
payments in some circumstances. This fact
serves to illustrate the impact on the
federal government of the state's
discriminatory tax exemption for state
retirees. Taxes enacted to reduce the
state's employment costs at the expense of
the Federal Treasury are the type of
discriminatory legislation the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity is intended
to bar.
Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. at 815, n.4.

Accordingly, a

pension increase is compatible with the doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity subsequent to removal of a
discriminatory tax exemption.

Such an increase does not

negatively impact the federal treasury, nor does it lessen
the tax burdens of state retirees.

The 1989 pension

increase is subject to federal taxation; it enhances the
federal treasury.
The trial court here correctly followed the guidelines
of Davis to conclude that there was no legal basis for
Plaintiffs' claims.

16

3.

The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed
Plaintiffs' Claims Recognizing That Davis
Anticipated A State's Ability To Increase
Retirement Benefits.

The lower court correctly applied Davis.

Judge Nehring

reasoned that "the Davis Court did not foreclose, and in
fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond to the
Court's holding by increasing benefits to its retirees."
(R. 349.)

The trial court reviewed similar challenges to

legislative responses to Davis and found that regardless of
the outcome, those cases recognized that principle.

(Id.)

As set forth in the previous section of this brief, that
reasoning is expressly found in statements by the Court in
Davis.
One such decision relied on by the trial court as
persuasive was Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), cert, refused, No. 010270, Va.
(April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 889, 122 S.Ct. 202
(mem)(Oct. 1, 2001)(R. 49), a trial Court decision that both
the United States and Virginia Supreme Courts have allowed
to stand by refusing to exercise their discretionary review
powers.
At issue in Almeter was whether Virginia had violated
the doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, when in
17

response to the U.S. Supreme Court's Davis decision, it
revoked a tax exemption for state retirees and raised
pension benefits to state retirees by 3%.
Court found that it had not.

The Virginia

The rationale that the Almeter

court relied on was that "In Davis, both the majority and
minority opinion recognized that a state's response to the
court's holding might be . . .

to pay extra money to state

retirees to makeup for what those retirees lost as a result
of being taxed."

Ld. at 2.

The Almeter court reasoned that

"the majority took no issue with the state's ability to
lawfully increase the benefits paid to state retirees to
offset the effect of the Court's holding. . . ."

Icl.

It

went on to say because "the actions complained about by
plaintiffs, even if true, are the types of actions
specifically contemplated and condoned by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Davis, plaintiffs have failed to
state a cause of action."

Id.

This Court should sustain the trial court's order of
dismissal on the same basis as that in Almeter.

18

4.

The Trial Court's Application Of Davis Is
Consistent With The Ragsdale Decision Of
The Oregon Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs argue that "no state of last resort has
reached a contrary result."

(Appellants' Brief at 17.)

However, Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348
(Or. 1995), sustained Oregon's first post-Davis public
employee pension increase.1

In a later decision, discussed

below, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that it wished to
"emphasize that our holding necessarily is confined to the
1995 statute.

We do not overrule Ragsdale

of the 1991 law. . . ."
P.2d 373, 383 (Or. 1997).

or its analysis

Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 960
Accordingly, Ragsdale is still

valid law in Oregon and did reach a contrary result.
At issue in Ragsdale was whether Oregon's increase of
retirement benefits payable to some state retirees violated
4 U.S.C. § 111 and the Davis decision.
held that it did not.

The Oregon court

Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1355.

In a

subsequent decision, the Oregon court summarized the factors
it had relied on in Ragsdale to sustain the public employee
pension increase:

Plaintiff's argument also does not recognize the
result in Almeter discussed above.
19

(1) the 1991 legislature had obeyed the
express dictate of Davis by repealing the
PERS [Public Employees Retirement System]
exemption; (2) Davis and, more generally,
the principle of intergovernmental tax
immunity, are indifferent to the level of
compensation a state pays to its retirees;
(3) the 1991 PERS increase was not part of
the system of taxation in Oregon, but,
instead, involved the expenditure of
retirement trust funds in the form of
increased compensation; and (4) there was
u
no correlation, either direct or
indirect, between state retirees' state
tax obligations and the amount of
increased PERS retirement benefits'' under
the 1991 statute.
Vogl v. Pep't of Rev., 960 P.2d 373, 376 (Oregon 1998) (this
case is discussed in detail below).

Based on these points,

the Ragsdale court concluded that "[t]axpayers' argument
lacks both a factual and a legal predicate."

Ragsdale, 895

P.2d at 1355.
If this Court decides to go beyond the express language
of Davis, the four points of reasoning relied on in Raqsdale
support dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint.

First, as set

forth above, Utah law complies expressly with the
requirements of the United States Supreme Court's Davis
decision.

Plaintiffs acknowledged in their Complaint that

"The legislature of the state of Utah recognized the effect
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis and revoked the state
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income tax exemption for retirement benefits received by
retired employees of the state under the state's retirement
system."

(Plaintiffs' Complaint at R. 5, 1 20.)

Second, the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis that Davis
is indifferent to the level of compensation that a state
pays its retirees is equally applicable here. The fact that
Utah has increased pension benefits by three percent is
irrelevant. As pointed out by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Ragsdale, "Davis does not hold or even intimate that a state
is prohibited from adjusting the compensation of its
employees, either currently or retired. . . ."

Ragsdale,

895 P.2d at 1353 n.ll.
Third, Utah's pension increase is not part of the
taxation system of Utah due to its source of funding, but is
on its face a pension increase funded by contributions.

It

is likewise not part of any tax return calculation.
Finally, Plaintiffs have cited no statutory language
showing that there is a link between the pension benefit
received by a state retiree and the amount of Utah State
income taxes paid by a retiree.

Indeed, the three percent

increase is totally independent of Utah state retiree's
state income tax liability.
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Utah law not only satisfies each of these points
analyzed by the Oregon court in sustaining the Oregon
pension statute, but it does not contain the provision most
troubling to that court.
would not be paid

In Raqsdale, the pension increase

NN

in any year in which the retirement

benefits payable under the Public Employees' Retirement
System are exempt from Oregon personal income taxation."
Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1351 (quoting the Oregon pension
statute).

The Utah statute does not contain this limitation

on the benefit.

The Utah retirement benefit provides for "a

new basis upon which any future adjustments to benefits are
made."

The plain language of the statute does not limit

this new basis by future changes in income tax status and
income tax laws.
Finally, the Ragsdale court addressed a point pressed
by Plaintiffs in this case--the timing of the pension
increase on the heels of the Davis decision.

The Oregon

court found that timing did not matter:
The 1991 increase in compensation is not
transformed into a tax rebate or tax
benefit simply because it was motivated in
whole or in part as a response to the
Davis decision and the consequent removal
of the tax exemption for PERS retirement
benefits. Moreover, it is important to
remember that state retirees will pay
22

state and federal income taxes on any
increased benefits they receive.
Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1355.
The reasoning of Ragsdale provides further support for
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims as a
matter of law.
B.

This Court should affirm the dismissal.

This Court Would Need To Exceed The Reasoning
Of The Montana And Oregon Courts To Overturn
The District Court.

This Court need not go beyond the express language of
Davis.

Plaintiffs Jensen and Thompson argue that this Court

should follow two decisions in Montana and Oregon.

The

trial court was not persuaded by those two decisions.

It

distinguished those cases "because the benefit increases
incorporated additional provisions which made transparent
the true and improper nature of the response — creating a tax
rebate."

(R. 349-350.)

The trial court concluded that

"Utah's statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of
the above mentioned provisions from which one could
reasonably conclude that the benefit increase was, in fact,
a tax rebate."

(R. 350. )

A discussion of the Oregon and Montana decisions is
most meaningful against the backdrop of Utah's pension
increase statute.
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1.

Utah's Pension Increase Is Not A Tax
Provision.

The Utah pension increase is not a tax provision and
does not fall under Davis or 4 U.S.C. § 111.

The important

elements contained in the plain language of Utah's pension
statute for 1999 and 2000 are:2
1.

It contains no requirement that a retiree be a Utah

taxpayer to qualify for the pension increase;3
2.

It establishes a 3% pension increase and is not

tied to the graduated marginal income tax rates (Utah's
income tax rates are not 3% across the board.); 4

2

Section 49-1-701 (1998) was renumbered by Laws of Utah
2002, ch. 250, § 44, and is now codified at Section 49-11701 (2002).
'

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (2) (a) and (b) (1998)
provide:
(2) £ny member who meets the conditions
established under Subsection (1) shall receive the
following:
(a) the administrator shall calculate the
members retirement allowance pursuant to
the formula governing the system from
which the member retired;
(b) the administrator shall then increase
the allowance calculated under Subsection
(2) (a) by 3%. . .
See also Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-104(2) (2000) (graduated tax
rates for applicable years in Plaintiffs' Complaint).
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3.

It is funded through contributions;5

4.

It provides for a new basis in the retirement

allowance, irrespective of any past, current, or future tax
rate changes;6 and
5.

It lacks language stating that it is part of a

claim of settlement for state retirees.7
These elements distinguish Utah's pension increase
statute from the statutes found in the two cases relied on
by Plaintiffs.
2.

The Montana Sheehy Decision Supports
Dismissal Of This Case.

The decision of the Montana Supreme Court supports
dismissal of the Complaint.

Plaintiffs have failed to

identify the sections of the Montana statute that the

' Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701(6) (a) (1998); see also id. at
Section 49-1-103(10) for definition of "contribution."
6 N

'[T]he adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection
(2)(b) is the new basis upon which any future adjustments to
benefits are made." Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (2)(c) (1998).
The Tax Commission has taken the position that the 1989 pension
increase provided for a vested right in the pension increase
irrespective of any past, current, or future tax rate changes.
However, the State of Utah has not been named a party to this
action and as such, it has not spoken on the vested nature of the
pension increase. This Court need not reach the vesting issue,
because it is undisputed that the legislature enact the pension
increase irrespective of any past, current, or future tax rate
change.
7

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).
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Montana Supreme Court relied on in Sheehy v. Public
Employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993), to
conclude that Montana's statute was in violation of 4 U.S.C.
§ 111.

The offending provisions do not exist under Utah's

Accordingly, Sheehy has no application here.8

law.

In Sheehy, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the
retirement adjustment payment contained in Montana law on
two principal grounds.

First, Montana law provided for an

annual retirement benefit supplement only to retirees who
had lost the tax exemption and were currently living in
Montana.

I_d. at 138.9

The Court reasoned that "The sole

purpose of the adjustment was to partially recompense state
retirees living in Montana for the tax they now must pay
under the equalizing provisions of chapter 823 [the Montana
statute enacted to remedy problems identified under 4 U.S.C.
8

Both Sheehy and Vogl, discussed below, go beyond the
plain language of Davis.
9

The court stated:
Et is clear that the adjustment is not an
actual and legitimate pension or
retirement benefit. If it were a pension
benefit, the State would have provided it
to all of its retirees in recognition of
their years of public service rather than
just those living in Montana.

Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
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§ 111]."

Id.

Second, the funding provisions for the retirement
compensation increase bore "no resemblance to the funding of
actual state retirement benefit adjustments previously
enacted by the legislature."

I_d.

Previously, funding for

the Montana Public Employee Retirement Programs was "by
investment income produced by the retirement fund made up of
employee and employer contributions."

.Id.

With the

offending statute, "[t]he funding for the so called
retirement adjustment payment is statutorily appropriated
from the general fund [on an annual basis] . . . that is,
from the taxes collected from all Montana taxpayers.

The

money to pay the adjustment never goes into the state
retirement funds, but is simply paid by the state treasurer
to the retirement board. . . . "

Id.

This Court should not adopt that reasoning.

First,

under Utah law, as cited in the previous section of this
brief, there is no residency limitation on the payment of
the pension increase.
taxpayer to qualify.

A retiree need not even be a Utah
All retirees benefit equally,

independent of their tax status. Accordingly, the Montana
statute has no analogous application to Utah.
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Second, under

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701(6), the Utah retirement allowance
is on its face a pension increase funded by contributions.
Plaintiffs concede that the pension increase here is not
directly funded from the general fund.

(Appellant's Opening

Brief at 21 n.4, 23 n.5.)
Plaintiffs' reliance on Sheehy is without merit.

This

Court would need to go beyond Sheehy and create new law to
hold in Plaintiffs' favor.
3.

The Analysis Of The Oregon Supreme Court
In Its Later Vogl Decision Also Supports
Dismissal Of The Complaint.

In the second Oregon pension decision, the Oregon
Supreme Court invalidated a statute that was enacted to
resolve claims of state retirees after the tax exemption was
removed from the Oregon retirement code.
Rev., 960 P.2d 373 (Oregon 1998).

Vogl v. Pep't of

The Oregon court

invalidated the statute on narrow grounds and concluded that
the relationship between the lost tax exemption and the
pension increase given in the statute was "not merely one of
logical causation . . . but of purported legal equivalence."
Id. at 381.
The court relied on the following elements of the
Oregon statute to invalidate it.
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First, the pension

increase calculation ran parallel to "the maximum state
income tax rate, including allowing the increase to rise and
fall along with that rate."

Id. at 380.

The court

concluded that "the formula is as close as the state can get
to replicating the effect of the repealed tax exemption
without delving into individual tax circumstances."

Id.

Second, by the express terms of the Oregon statute, no
state retiree "^shall acquire a right, contractual or
otherwise, to the increased benefits provided [therein.]'"
Id. (quoting the offending Oregon statute).

The court

reasoned that if the state were paying an actual pension
increase that the court "would expect those employees to
obtain a vested right to it."

Id.

Finally, the court reasoned, the statute expressly
stated that it was intended to represent "^full, complete,
and final payment of any claim of a member of the system . .
. arising out of the taxation of those benefits.'" Id.
(quoting the offending Oregon statute).

In other words, the

"legislature's designation of the increase as legal
compensation shows . . . that it is not a mere benefit
increase."

Id.

These elements do not exist under the Utah statute.
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First, as discussed above, the pension increase provisions
of the Utah statute do not run parallel to the Utah Tax
Code. Second, exactly opposite of Oregon's statute, the
three percent Utah pension increase provides for a new basis
in the retirement allowance.

Finally, the Utah statute does

not contain the state retiree claim settlement language
contained in the Oregon statute.

Although Plaintiffs allege

a breach of contract by Utah against state retirees, they
offer no legal support for this argument, nor was it pled in
their complaint.

Vogl provides no reason that the district

court was incorrect in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the district court properly
dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs
are not entitled to a tax exemption under Davis and the
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.
DATED this Z ^ / -

day of November, 2003.

«Lcy^c—
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1
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J
sistant Attorneys General
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ADDENDUM A
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4USCA§ 111
4U.S.C.A. § 111

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 4. FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMEN
\ \ n : ; n- s'i \ ! IS
CHAPTER 4-THE STATES
§ 111. Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income tax

(a) General rule.—The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an
officer or employee of the United States, a territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the government
of the District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of
the source of the pay or compensation.

(b) Treatment <>l certain ledcral employees employed at Federal hulroelectnc facilities locatnl i
Columbia River.-Pa\ or compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an employee oi the
IJnited States at j hydroelectric facility—
(1) wh\\ h i-, on iled I)-, flie ('iiited States;
(2) which is located on the Columbia River; and
(3) portions of which are within the States of Oregon and Washington,
shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident

(e) ' I reatment of cei tain Federal employees employed at Federal hydroelectric facilities lot a ted m- m.
Missouri River.—Pay or compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an employee ot the
United States at a hydroelectric facility—
(1) \' h i c 11 i s o w ii c d b y th e 1 111 i te d S t a te s;
(2) which is located on the Missouri River; and
(3) portions of which are within the States of South Dakota and Nebraska,
shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident.

CRHDi HN>
(Added Pub.L. 89-554, § 2(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 608, ai i< 1 amei ided I "til ).T
1075(b)(1), Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2138.)
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U T ST §49-1-701
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-1-701
UTAH' CODE, 1953
Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981,

1982,

1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1990 by The Michie

Company. All rights reserved.
TITLE 49. PENSIONS
CHAPTER 1. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT
PART 7. TAXATION PROVISIONS

49-1-701. Retirement allowance increase to offset tax liability -- Administration.

(1) This section applies to members of any system administered by the board
under Title 4 9, whose retirement allowance remained exempt from the tax imposed
under Chapter 10, Title 59, pursuant to Section 2, Chapter 195, Laws of Utah 1988,
but whose allowance has subsequently become subject to that tax.
(2) Any member who meets the conditions established under Subsection
receive the following:

(1) shall

(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's retirement allowance
pursuant to the formula governing the system from which the member retired;
(b) the administrator shall then increase the allowance calculated under
Subsection (2)(a) by 3%; and
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection
upon which any future adjustments to benefits are made.

(2)(b) is the new basis

(3) (a) For all members who retire or are receiving retirement allowances in
calendar year 1989, the administrator shall apply the 3% adjustment under
Subsection (2) to all retirement allowances received in 1989, so that the period
for which the allowance becomes subject to the tax under Chapter 10, Title 59, and
the period for which the 3% adjustment is given are the same.
(b) For all members who retire after December 31, 1989, and who meet the
requirements of Subsection (1), the administrator shall apply the 3% adjustment
under Subsection (2) beginning on the effective date of retirement.
(4) Any penalty or interest for underpayment of taxes under Chapter 1 or 10,
Title 59, shall be waived for members whose noncompliance is attributable to
Section 49-1-608 and this section. This only applies to tax year 1989.
(5) The administrator shall comply with Part 4, Chapter 10, Title 59, with
respect to withholding of taxes.
(6) The retirement board shall annually certify the contribution rate necessary
Copr. © West 2003 T v t !(.i:n u> i JU-- • -•
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U T ST §49-1-701
U.C.A. 1953 §49-1-701

for each system to comply with this section and may adopt rules to administer this
section.

History: C. 1953, 49-1-701, enacted by L. 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 8, § 1; 1990, ch.
42, § 1; 1990, ch. 285, § 6.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. -- The 1990 amendment by ch. 42, effective March 7, 1990,
substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in Subsection (2)(c) and deleted former
Subsection (7), relating to legislative review of the benefit adjustment.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 285, effective July 1, 1990, added the second sentence
in Subsection (4).
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and
General Counsel.

Compiler's Notes. -- Laws 1988, ch. 195, § 2, cited in Subsection (1), made §
49-1-608, exempting benefits from taxation except for the individual income tax,
applicable "only to the retirement allowance of persons who entered a system
administered by the retirement office on or after [January 1, 1989]." Laws 1988,
ch. 195, § 2 was repealed by Laws 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 3 and ch. 7, § 3.

Effective Dates. —
October 10, 1989.

Laws 1989 (2nd S.S.)r

ch. 8, § 2 makes the act effective on

U. C. A. 1953 § 49-1-701
UT ST § 4 9 1 ; '() 11
END OF DOCUMENT
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103 L.Ed.2d 891, 57 USLW 4389, 63 A.F.I .R.2d v)-1 i
(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500)
f>

, iVJ-2 ( ~'U ) ' •'•

I e 1
•• Linplowc iJcnclits v a> •'••

(Formerly 36lk212)

Supreme Court of the United States

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY.
No. 87-1020.
Argued Jan. 9, 1989.
Decided March 28, 1989.
Former federal employee brought suit seeking
refunds of state taxes paid on his federal retirement
benefits. The Michigan Court of Claims denied
relief. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals,
160 Mich.App. 98, 408 N.W.2d 433, affirmed.
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal, probable jurisdiction was noted. The
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that
Michigan Income Tax Act violated principles of
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired
state and local government employees over retired
federal employees.

Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion.
1 ) 9 I \ich ;pp. 683, 1 16

West Headnotes
i\jtion

Mj i .uauon €=>Q87
371k9S7 Most Cited Cases
Statutory intergovernmental tax immunity for state
taxes that discriminate against federal employees on
basis of source of their compensation is coextensive
with prohibition against discriminatory taxes
embodied in modem constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111.
[4] Taxation €=>987
371k987 Most Cited Cases
Michigan Income Tax Act, which exempted from
taxation all retirement benefits paid by the state or
its political subdivisions, but taxed retirement
benefits paid by other employees, including
employees of federal government, violated
principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. 4
U.S.C.A. § 111
15] I axation €=>987
371k987 Most Cited Cases

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion on remand
N.W.2d531.

When Congress codifies a judicially defined
concept, it is presumed, absent express statement to
the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt
interpretation placed on that concept by the courts.

^—'987

;"lk9N7 Most Cited Cases
Federal statute authorizing states to tax "pay or
compensation for personal services as [a federal]
officer or employee * * * if the taxation does not
discriminate against the employee because of the
source of the pay or compensation" applied to
federal retirees, and was not limited to current
federal employees. 4 U.S.C.A. §111.
;2| Miiiutes€==>212.7
M>!k212.7 Most Cited Cases

1 'pnn determining that Michigan Income Tax Act
;i)]jk'ii principles of intergovernmental tax
immunity by favoring retired state and local
government employees over retired
federal
employees, federal retiree's claim could be resolved
either by extending tax exemption to retired federal
employees, or to all retired employees, or by
eliminating exemption for retired state and local
government employees. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111.
**1501 Syllabus [FN*]

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S.
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 I .Ed. 499.
M. . .
. ••* :r. • >ea; : rro- thiough WS4,
appellant .« Mulligan resident and former i.-.vral
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employee, paid state income tax on his federal
letirement benefits in accordance with the Michigan
Income Tax Act, which exempts from taxation all
retirement benefits paid by the State or its political
subdivisions, but taxes retirement benefits paid by
other employers, including the Federal Government
After the State denied appellant's request for
refunds, he filed suit in the Michigan Court of
Claims, alleging that the State's inconsistent
treatment of retirement benefits violated 4 U S C §
111, which authorizes States to tax "pay or
compensation for personal services as [a federal]
officer or employee , if the taxation does not
discriminate against the
employee because of the
source of the pay or compensation" The Court of
Claims denied lelief, and the Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed, ruling that appellant is an
"annuitant" under federal law rather than an
"employee" within the meaning of § 111, and that
that section therefore has no application to him
The Court of Appeals also held that the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity did not render the
State's discriminatory tax scheme unconstitutional,
since the discrimination was justified under a
rational-basis test The State's interest in attracting
and retaining qualified employees was a legitimate
objective which was rationally achieved by a
letirement plan offering economic inducements
Held
1 Section 111 applies to federal retirees such as
appellant The State's contention that the section is
limited to cunent federal employees is refuted by
the plain language of the statute's first clause
Since the amount of civil service retirement benefits
is based and computed upon an individual's salary
and years of service, it represents deferred
compensation for service to the Government, and
therefore constitutes "pay or compensation
as [a
federal] employee" withm the meaning of that
clause The State's contention that, since this
quoted language does not occur in the statute's
second, nondiscrimination clause, that clause
applies only to cunent employees, is hypertechnical
and fails to read the nondiscrimination clause in its
context within the overall statutory scheme The
reference to "the pay or compensation" in the latter
clause must, in context, mean the same "pay or
compensation" defined in *804 the section's first
clause and thus includes retirement benefits The
State's reading of the clause is implausible because
Copi © West 2003 No Claim

it is unlikely that Congiess consented to
discriminatory taxation of retired federal civil
servants' pensions while refusing to permit such
taxation of current employees, and there is nothing
in the statutory language or legislative history to
suggest such a result Pp 1503-1505
2 Section Ill's language, purpose, and legislative
history establish that the scope of its
nondiscrimination clause's grant or retention of
limited tax immunity for federal employees is
coextensive with, and must be determined by
reference to, **1502 the prohibition against
discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity Pp 1505-1507
3 Michigan's tax scheme violates principles of
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired
state and local government employees over retired
federal employees Pp 1507-1508
(a) The State's contention that appellant is not
entitled to claim the protection of the immunity
doctrine is without merit Although the doctrine is
based on the need to protect each sovereign's
governmental operations from undue interference
by another sovereign, this Court's precedents
establish that private entities or individuals who are
subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of
their dealings with a sovereign can themselves
receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine
See, for example, Phillips Chemical Co v Dumas
Independent School Dist 361 U S 376, 387, 80
SCt 474, 481, 4 L Ed 2d 384 Pp 1506-1507
(b) In determining whethei the State's inconsistent
tax tieatment of federal and state retirees is
permissible, the relevant inquiry is whether the
inconsistency is directly related to and justified by
"significant differences between the two classes "
Phillips, supia, at 384-385, 80 S C t , at 479- 480
The State's claimed interest in hiring qualified civil
servants through the inducement of a tax exemption
for retirement benefits is irrelevant to this inquiry,
since it merely demonstrates that the State has a
rational reason for discriminating between two
similar groups of retnees without demonstrating any
differences between those groups themselves
Moreover, the State's claim that its retirement
benefits are significantly less munificent than
federal benefits in terms of vesting requirements,
Orig U S Govt Works
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rate ot accrual, and benefit computations is
insufficient to justify the type of blanket exemption
at issue here A ta\ exemption tiul> intended to
account for differences in benefits would not
discriminate on the basis of the source of those
benefits, but w ould, rather, discriminate on the basis
of the amount of benefits received b> individual
retirees Pp 1507-1508

Michael K Kellogg, Washington, D C , toi the
U S , as amicus cunae, supporting appellant b\
special leave oi Couit

J Because tin Stati concedes that a ielund is
appropriate in these circumstances, appellant is
entitled to a refund to the extent he has paid *805
taxes pursuant to the invalid Michigan scheme
However, his additional claim for prospective relief
from discilminatory taxation should be decided by
the state comts, whose special expertise in state law
puts them in a better position than this Court to
fashion the remedy most appiopnate to comply with
the constitutional mandate of equal treatment Pp
1S08-1S0Q

( oui t

Thomas L Casey, Lansing, Mich , foi appellee

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the

160 MichApp 98, 408 N \\ 2d 433 (1987)
it v11sed and lemanded
KENNEDY, J , delivered the opinion of the Court,
m which RFHNQUIST, C J , and BRENNAN,
WHITE,
MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN,
O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ, joined STEVENS
J filed a dissenting opinion, post p —
Paul S Da\is pio se aigued the cause and iilul
briefs for appellant
Mi dun I k ktllogg aigued the cause ioi the United
States as amicus cuuae urging rev eisal With him
on the brief vveie Sohcitoi Geneial Filed Assistant
Attorney Geneial Rose Deputy Sohcitoi Geneial
Men ill Da\id English Caimack and Ste\en IV
Paiks
Thomas L Case\ Assistant Solicitor Geneial of
Michigan, aigued the cause for appellee With him
on the bnef were FiankJ Kelley, Attorney General,
Louis J Caiuso Solicitor General, and Richaid R
Roesch and Ross H Bishop Assistant Attorneys
General *
* Joseph B Scott and Michael J katof tiled a bnei
for the National Association of Retired Federal
Fmplovees as amicus cunae urging reversal
Fml S Davis foi appellant

The State ot Michigan exempts from taxation all
retirement benefits paid by the State or its political
subdivisions, but levies an income tax on retirement
benefits paid by all other employers, including the
Federal Government The question presented by
this case is whether Michigan's tax scheme violates
federal law
I
Appellant Paul S Davis a Michigan
resident, is a formei employee of the
United States Government He receives
retnement *806 benefits **1503 pursuant
to the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5
U S C § 8331 et seq In each of the years
1979 thiough
1984, appellant paid
Michigan state income tax on his federal
letirement benefits in accordance with
Mich Comp Laws Ann
§ 206 30(l)(f)
(Supp 1988) [FN1] That statute defines
taxable income in a manner that excludes
all retirement benefits received fiom the
State oi its political subdivisions, but
includes most other forms of retirement
benefits
[FN2] The effect of this
definition is that the ietnement benefits of
retired state employees are exempt from
state taxation while the benefits received
b) letned fedeial employees are not
FN1 As a result of a series of amendments, this
subsection has been variously designated as (l)(f)
(l)(g), and (l)(h) at times relevant to this litigation
This opinion will refer only to the cunent fatiif H\
designation, §206 30(1 )(f)
TT\J In peitintnt pait the statute piovides
( 1) I a\abk income
means idjusted
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gioss income as defined in the internal
revenue code subject to the following
adjustments
ijc

*

sfc

"(f) Deduct to the extent included in
adjusted gross income
"(1) Retirement or pension benefits
received from a public retirement system
of or created by an act of this state or a
political subdivision of this state
***
"(IV) Retirement or pension benefits from
any othei retirement or pension system as
follows "(A) For a single return, the sum
of not more than $7,500 00
"(B) Foj a joint return, the sum of not
more than $10,000 00" Mich Comp Laws
Ann § 206 30(l)(i) (Supp 1988)
Subsection (f)(iv) of this piovision
exempts a portion of otherwise taxable
retirement benefits from taxable income,
but appellant's retirement pay from all
nonstate sources exceeded the applicable
exemption amount in each of the tax years
relevant to this case

In 1984, appellant petitioned for refunds of state
taxes paid on his fedeial retirement benefits
between 1979 and 1983 After his request was
denied, appellant filed suit in the Michigan Court of
Claims
Appellant's
complaint,
which
was
amended to include the 1984 tax yeai, averred that
his federal retirement benefits were "not legally
taxable undei *807 the Michigan Income Tax Law"
and that the State's inconsistent treatment of state
and federal retirement benefits discriminated
against fedeial retnees in violation of 4 U S C § 111
, which preserves federal employees' immunity from
discriminatory state taxation See Public Salary
Tax Act of 1939, ch 59, § 4, 53 Stat 575, codified,
as amended, at 4 U S C § 111 The Court of
Claims, however, denied relief No 84-9451 (Oct
30, 1985), App toJuns Statement A10
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 160
Mich App 98, 408 N W 2 d 433 (1987) The court
first lejected appellant's claim that 4 U S C § 111
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invalidated the State's tax on appellant's federal
benefits Noting that § 111 applies only to federal
"employees," the court determined that appellant's
status under federal law was that of an "annuitant"
rather than an employee As a consequence, the
court concluded that § 111 "has no application to
[Davis], since [he] cannot be considered an
employee within the meaning of that act" Id, at
104, 408 N W 2d, at 435
The Michigan Court of Appeals next rejected
appellant's contention that the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity rendered the State's
tax treatment of federal retirement benefits
unconstitutional Conceding that "a tax may be
held invalid
if it operates to discriminate against
the federal government and those with whom it
deals," id at 104, 408 N W 2 d , at 436, the court
examined the State's justifications for the
discrimination under a rational- basis test Ibid
The court determined that the State's interest in
"attracting and retaining
qualified employees"
was a "legitimate state objective which is rationally
achieved by a retnement plan offering economic
inducements," and it upheld **1504 the statute Id,
at 105, 408 N W 2d, at 436
The Supreme Court of Michigan denied appellant's
application for leave to appeal 429 Mich 854, 412
NW2d
220 (1987)
We noted probable
jurisdiction 487 U S 1217, 108 SCt 2868, 101
L Ed 2d 904(1988)
*808 II
Appellant places principal reliance on 4 U S C §
111 In relevant part, that section provides
"The United States consents to the taxation of pay
or compensation for personal service as an officer
or employee of the United States
by a duly
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if
the taxation does not discriminate against the
officer or employee because of the source of the
pay or compensation "
[1] As a threshold matter, the State argues that §
111 applies only to current employees of the
Federal Government, not to retirees such as
appellant In our view, however, the plain
language of the statute dictates the opposite
conclusion Section 111 by its terms applies to "the
taxation of pay or compensation foi peisonal
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services as an officer or employee of the United
States." (Emphasis added). While retirement pay
is not actually disbursed during the time an
individual is working for the Government, the
amount of benefits to be received in retirement is
based and computed upon the individual's salary
and years of service. 5 U.S.C. § 8339(a). We have
no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement
benefits are deferred compensation for past years of
service rendered to the Government. See, e.g.,
Zitcker v. United States, 758 F.2d 637, 639 (CA
Fed.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88
L.Ed.2d 105 (1985); Kizas v. Webster, 227
U.S.App.D.C. 327, 339, 707 F.2d 524, 536 (1983),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S.Ct. 709, 79
L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Clark v United States, 691
F.2d 837, 842 (CA7 1982). And because these
benefits accme to employees on account of their
service to the Government, they fall squarely within
the category of compensation for services rendered
"as an officer or employee of the United States."
Appellant's federal retirement benefits are deferred
compensation earned "as" a federal employee, and
so are subject to § 111. [FN3]

FN3. The State suggests that the legislative
history does not support this interpretation
of § 111, pointing to statements in the
Committee Reports that describe the scope
of § 111 without using the phrase "service
as an officer or employee." The language
of the statute leaves no room for doubt on
this point, however, so the State's attempt
to establish a minor inconsistency with the
legislative history need not detain us.
Legislative history is irrelevant to the
interpretation of an unambiguous statute.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434
U.S. 192, 199, 98 S.Ct. 444, 448, 54
L.Ed.2d 402 (1977).

*809 Ihe State points out, however, that the
reference to "compensation for personal services as
an officer or employee" occurs in the first part of §
111, which defines the extent of Congress' consent
to state taxation, and not in the latter part of the
section, which provides that the consent does not
extend to taxes that discriminate against federal
employees. Instead, the nondiscrimination clause
speaks only in terms of "discriminatfion] against the

officer or employee because of the source of the pay
or compensation." From this the State concludes
that, whatever the scope of Congress' consent to
taxation in the first portion of § 111, the
nondiscrimination clause applies only to current
federal employees.
Although the State's hypertechmcal reading of the
nondiscrimination clause is not inconsistent with the
language of that provision examined in isolation,
statutory language cannot be construed in a \ acuiim.
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme. See United States v. Morton,
467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81
L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). When the first part of § 111
is **1505 read together with the nondiscrimination
clause, the operative words of the statute are as
follows: "The United States consents to the
taxation of pay or compensation ... if the taxation
does not discriminate ... because of the source of the
pay or compensation." The reference to "the pay
or compensation" in the last clause of § 111 must,
in context, mean the same "pay or compensation"
defined in the first part of the section. Since that
"pay or compensation" includes retirement benefits,
the nondiscrimination clause must include them as
well.
A

810
Any
othei
interpretation
oi
I he
nondiscrimination clause would be implausible at
best. It is difficult to imagine that Congress
consented to discriminatory taxation of the pensions
of retired federal civil servants while refusing to
permit such taxation of current employees, and
nothing in the statutory language or even in the
legislative history suggests this result. While
Congress could perhaps have used more pieeise
language, the overall meaning of § 111 is
unmistakable: it waives whatever immunity past
and present federal employees would otherwise
enjoy from state taxation of salaries, retirement
benefits, and other forms of compensation paid on
account of their employment with the Federal
Government, except to the extent that such taxation
discriminates on account of the source of the
compensation.
Ill
Section 111 was enacted as part ol the Public
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Salary Tax Act of 1939, the primary purpose of
which was to impose federal income tax on the
salaries of all state and local government
employees Prior to adoption of the Act, salaries of
most government employees, both state and federal,
generally were thought to be exempt from taxation
by another sovereign under the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity This doctrine had
its genesis in McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat
316, 4 LEd 570 (1819), which held that the State
of Maryland could not impose a discriminatory tax
on the Bank of the United States Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court reasoned that the
Bank was an instrumentality of the Federal
Government used to carry into effect the
Government's delegated powers, and taxation by the
State would unc onstitutionally interfere with the
exercise of those powers Id at 425-437
For a time, McCulloch was read bioadly to bar
most taxation by one sovereign of the employees of
another See Collectoi \ Day 11 Wall 113,
124-128, 20 LEd 122 (1871) (invalidating federal
income tax on salary of state judge), *811Dobbms
v Commissioner of Ene County 16 Pet 435, 10
LEd 1022 (1842) (invalidating state tax on federal
officer) This rule "was based on the rationale that
any tax on income a party received under a contiact
with the government was a tax on the contract and
thus a tax 'on' the government because it bmdened
the gov ernment's power to enter into the contract"
South Cawhna \ Bakei 485 U S 505, 518, 108
SCt 1355, 1364, 99 LEd 2d 592 (1988)
In subsequent cases, howevei the Court began to
rum away fiom its more expansive applications of
the immunity doctrine Thus, in Hehenng v
Geihaidt 304 U S 405, 58 SCt 969, 82 LEd
1427 (1938), the Court held that the Federal
Government couli levy nondiscriminatory taxes on
the incomes of most state employees The
following year, Gia\es \ New Yoik ex lei O'Keefe
306 U S 466, 486-487, 59 SCt 595, 601-602, 83
LEd 927 (1939) overruled the Da\- Dobbins line
of cases that had exempted government employees
from nondiscriminatory taxation After Giaves
theiefore, mteigovernmental tax immunity barred
only those taxes that were imposed directly on one
sovereign by the other or that discriminated against
a sovereign or tho>e with whom it dealt
It was in the midst of this judicial revision of the

immunity doctrine that Congress decided to extend
the federal income tax to state and local government
employees The Public Salary Tax Act was
enacted **1506 after Helve?ing v Geihaidt, supia,
had upheld the imposition of federal income taxes
on state civil servants, and Congress relied on that
decision as support for its broad assertion of federal
taxing authority S Rep No 112, 76th Cong, 1st
Sess, 5-9 (1939), HRRep No 26, 76th Cong,
1st Sess, 2-3 (1939) However, the Act was
drafted, considered m Committee, and passed by the
House of Representatives before the announcement
of the decision m Giaves v New Yoik ex lei
O'Keefe supia, which for the first time permitted
state taxation of federal employees As a result,
during most of the legislative process leading to
adoption of the Act it was unclear whether state
taxation of federal employees was still barred by
intergovernmental *812 tax immunity despite the
abrogation of state employees' immunity from
federal taxation See HRRep No 26, supia, at 2
("There are certain indications in the case of
McCulloch \ Maryland 4 Wheat 316 [4 LEd
579] (1819),
that
Federal officers and
employees may not, without the consent of the
United States, be subjected to income taxation
under the authority of the various States")
Dissatisfied with this uncertain state of affairs, and
concerned that considerations of fairness demanded
equal tax treatment for state and federal employees,
Congress decided to ensure that federal employees
would not remain immune from state taxation at the
same time that state government employees were
being required to pay federal income taxes See
SRep No 112, supia at 4, HRRep No 26,
supia at 2 Accordingly, § 4 of the proposed Act
(now § 111) expressly waived whatever immunity
would have otherwise shielded federal employees
fiom nondiscriminatory state taxes
By the time the statute was enacted, of course, the
decision in Giaves had been announced, so the
constitutional immunity doctrine no longer
proscribed nondiscriminatory state taxation of
federal employees In effect, § 111 simply codified
the result in Gia\es and foreclosed the possibility
that subsequent judicial reconsideration of that case
might reestablish the broader interpretation of the
immunity doctrine
Section

111

did

not
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intergovernmental tax immunity, however. I he
final clause of the section contains an exception for
state taxes that discriminate against federal
employees on the basis of the source of their
compensation. This nondiscrimination
clause
closely parallels the nondiscrimination component
of the constitutional immunity doctrine which has,
from the time of McCuUoch v. Maiyland, barred
taxes that "operat[e] so as to discriminate against
the Government or those with whom it deals."
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473,
78 S.Ct. 474, 478, 2 L.Ed.2d 424 (1958). See also
McCuUoch v. Maryland, supra, 4 Wheat., at
436-437; *8l3MiIler v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713,
714-715, 47 S.Ct. 280, 280-281, 71 L.Ed. 487
(1927); Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra, 304 U.S., at
413, 58 S.Ct., at 972; Phillips Chemical Co. v.
Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376,
385, 80 S.Ct. 474, 480, 4 L.Ed.2d 384 (1960);
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S.
392, 397, and n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 692, 696, and n. 7, 74
L.Ed.2d 562 (1983).
[2][3] In view of the similarity of language and
purpose between the constitutional principle of
nondiscrimination
and
the
statutory
nondiscrimination clause, and given that § 111 was
consciously drafted against the background of the
Court's tax immunity cases, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress drew upon the constitutional
doctrine in defining the scope of the immunity
retained in § 111. When Congress codifies a
judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an
express statement to the contrary, that Congress
intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that
concept by the courts. See Midian tic National
Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501, 106 S.Ct. 755,
759-760, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240,
249-250, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Hence, we
conclude that the retention **1507 of immunity in §
111 is coextensive with the prohibition against
discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity. Cf. Memphis Bank & Trust, supra, 459
U.S., at 396-397, 103 S.Ct., at 695-696 (construing
31 U.S.C. § 742, which permits only "
'nondiscriminatory' " state taxation of interest on
federal obligations, as "principally a restatement of
the constitutional rule").

i 7
]

On its face, § 111 purports to be nothing more than
a partial congressional consent to nondiscriminatory
state taxation of federal employees. It can be
argued, however, that by negative implication § 111
also constitutes an affirmative statutory grant of
immunity from discriminatory state taxation in
addition to, and coextensive with, the pre-existing
protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine.
Regardless of whether § 111 provides an
independent basis for finding immunity or merely
preserves the traditional constitutional prohibition
against discriminatory taxes, however, the inquiry
*814 is the same. In either case, the scope of the
immunity
granted
or
retained
by
the
nondiscrimination clause is to be determined by
reference to the constitutional doctrine. Thus, the
dispositive question in this case is whether the tax
imposed on appellant is barred by the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity.
IV
[4J It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system
discriminates in favor of retired state employees and
against retired federal employees. The State
argues, however, that appellant is not entitled to
claim the protection of the immunity doctrine, and
that in any event the State's inconsistent treatment
of Federal and State Government retirees is justified
by meaningful differences between the two classes.
A
In suppoit oi its inst contention, the State points
out that the purpose of the immunity doctrine is to
protect governments and not private entities or
individuals. As a result, so long as the challenged
tax does not interfere with the Federal
Government's ability to perform its governmental
functions, the constitutional doctrine has not been
violated.
It is fine that intergovernmental tax immunity is
based on the need to protect each sovereign's
governmental operations from undue interference
by the other. Graves, 306 U.S., at 481, 59 S.Ct., at
598; McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 435-436
. But it does not follow that private entities or
individuals who are subjected to discriminatory
taxation on account of their dealings with a
sovereign cannot themselves receive the protection
of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed, all precedent
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is to the contrary. In Phillips Chemical Co., supra,
for example, we considered a private corporation's
claim that a state tax discriminated against private
lessees of federal land. We concluded that the tax
"discriminate^] unconstitutionally against the
United States and its lessee," and accordingly held
that the tax could not be exacted. Id., 361 U.S., at
387, 80 S.Ct, at 481 *815 (emphasis added). See
also Memphis Bank & Trust, supra; Moses Lake
Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 81
S.Ct. 870, 6 L.Ed.2d 66 (1961); Collector v. Day,
11 Wall. 113, 20 L.Ed. 122 (1871); Dobbins v.
Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10
L.Ed. 1022 (1842). The State offers no reasons for
departing from this settled rule, and we decline to
do so. [FN4]

FN4. The dissent argues that this tax is
nondiscriminatory, and thus constitutional,
because it "draws no distinction between
the federal employees or retirees and the
vast majority of voters in the State." Post,
at 1512. In Phillips Chemical Co.,
however, we faced that precise situation:
an equal tax burden was imposed on
lessees of private, tax- exempt property
and lessees of federal property, while
lessees of state property paid a lesser tax,
or in some circumstances none at all.
Although we concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances, there appears to be no
discrimination between the Government's
lessees and lessees of private property,"
361 U.S., at 381, 80 S.Ct, at 478, we
nonetheless invalidated the State's tax.
This result is consistent with the
underlying rationale for the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity. The
danger that a State is engaging in
impermissible discrimination against the
Federal Government is greatest when the
State acts to benefit itself and those in
privity with it. As we observed in Phillips
Chemical Co., "it does not seem too much
to require that the State treat those who
deal with the Government as well as it
treats those with whom it deals itself." Id.,
at 385, 80 S.Ct., at 480.
We also take issue with the dissent's
assertion that "it is peculiarly inappropriate
to focus solely on the treatment of state

governmental employees" because "[t]he
State may always compensate in pay or
salary for what it assesses in taxes." Post,
at 1512. In order to provide the same
after-tax benefits to all retired state
employees by means of increased salaries
or benefit payments instead of a tax
exemption, the State would have to
increase its outlays by more than the cost
of the current tax exemption, since the
increased payments to retirees would result
in higher federal income tax payments in
some circumstances. This fact serves to
illustrate the impact on the Federal
Government of the State's discriminatory
tax exemption for state retirees. Taxes
enacted to reduce the State's employment
costs at the expense of the federal treasury
are the type of discriminatory legislation
that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity is intended to bar.

**1508B
Under our precedents, "[t]he imposition of a
heavier tax burden on [those who deal with one
sovereign] than is imposed *816 on [those who deal
with the other] must be justified by significant
differences between the two classes." Phillips
Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist.,
361 U.S., at 383, 80 S.Ct, at 479. In determining
whether this standard of justification has been met,
it is inappropriate to rely solely on the mode of
analysis developed in our equal protection cases.
We have previously observed that "our decisions in
[the equal protection] field are not necessarily
controlling where problems of intergovernmental
tax immunity are involved," because "the
Government's interests must be weighed in the
balance." Id., at 385, 80 S.Ct, at 480. Instead, the
relevant inquiry is whether the inconsistent tax
treatment is directly related to, and justified by,
"significant differences between the two classes."
Id., at 383-385, 80 S.Ct, at 479-480.
The State points to two allegedly significant
differences between federal and state retirees.
First, the State suggests that its interest in hiring and
retaining qualified civil servants through the
inducement of a tax exemption for retirement
benefits is sufficient to justify the preferential
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treatment of its retired employees. This argument
is wholly beside the point, however, for it does
nothing to demonstrate that there are "significant
differences between the two classes" themselves;
rather, it merely demonstrates that the State has a
rational reason for discriminating between two
similar groups of retirees. The State's interest in
adopting the discriminatory tax, no matter how
substantial, is simply irrelevant to an inquiry into
the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent
treatment. See id., at 384, 80 S.Ct., at 479.
Second, the State argues that its retirement benefits
are significantly less munificent than those offered
by the Federal Government, in terms of vesting
requirements, rate of accmal, and computation of
benefit amounts. The substantial differences in the
value of the retirement benefits paid the two classes
should, in the State's view, justify the inconsistent
tax treatment.
*817 Even assuming the State's estimate of the
relative value of state and federal retirement
benefits is generally correct, we do not believe this
difference suffices to justify the type of blanket
exemption at issue in this case. While the average
retired federal civil servant receives a larger
pension than his state counterpart, there are
undoubtedly many individual instances in which the
opposite holds true. A tax exemption truly
intended to account for differences in retirement
benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the
source of those benefits, as Michigan's statute does;
rather, it would discriminate on the basis of the
amount of benefits received by individual retirees.
Cf. Phillips Chemical Co., supra, at 384-385, 80
S.Ct., at 479-480 (rejecting proffered rationale for
State's **1509 unfavorable tax treatment of lessees
of federal property, because an evenhanded
application of the rationale would have resulted in
inclusion of some lessees of State property in the
disfavored class as well).
V
For these reasons, we conclude that the Michigan
Income
Tax
Act
violates
principles
of
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired
state and local government employees over retired
federal employees. The State having conceded that
a refund is appropriate in these circumstances, see
Brief for Appellee 63, to the extent appellant has

paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is
entitled to a refund. See lowa-Des Moines
National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247, 52
S.Ct. 133, 136, 76 I .Ed. 265 (1931).
Appellant also seeks prospective relief from
discriminatory taxation. With respect to this claim,
however, we are not in the best position to ascertain
the appropriate remedy. While invalidation of
Michigan's income tax law in its entirety obviously
would eliminate the constitutional violation, the
Constitution does not require such a drastic
solution. We have recognized, in cases involving
invalid classifications in the distribution of
government benefits, that the appropriate remedy
"is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can
be *818 accomplished by withdrawal of benefits
from the favored class as well as by extension of
benefits to the excluded class." Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 740, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1395, 79
L.Ed.2d 646 (1984). See lowa-Des Moines
National Bank, supra, 284 U.S., at 247, 52 S.Ct., at
136; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
361, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1807, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970)
(I Iar 1 a 11, J., c oneurring in j udgment).
[5] In this ease,, appellant's claim could be resolved
either by extending the tax exemption to retired
federal employees (or to all retired employees), or
by eliminating the exemption for retired state and
local government employees. The latter approach,
of course, could be construed as the direct
imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the
power of a federal court. See Moses Lake Homes,
Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S., at 752, 81 S.Ct., at
874 ("Federal courts may not assess or levy taxes").
The permissibility of either approach, moreover,
depends in part on the severability of a portion of §
206.30(1 )(f) from the remainder of the Michigan
Income Tax Act, a question of state law within the
special expertise of the Michigan courts. See Louis
K. Liggett Co, v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 540-541, 53
S.Ct. 481, 486-487, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933). It
follows that the Michigan courts are in the best
position to determine how to comply with the
mandate of equal treatment. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Justice STEVENS, dissenting
The States can tax federal employees or private
parties who do business with the United States so
long as the tax does not discriminate against the
United States South Cawhna v Bakei, 485 U S
505, 523, 108 SCt 1355, 1366, 99 LEd2d 592
(1988), United States v County of Fiesno, 429
U S 452, 462, 97 S Ct 699, 704, 50 L Ed 2d 683
(1977) The Court today strikes down a state tax
that applies equally to the vast majority of Michigan
residents, including federal employees, because it
treats retired state employees differently from
retired federal employees The Court's holding is
not supported by the rationale for the
intergovernmental lmmunitydoctrme *819 and is
not compelled by our previous decisions I cannot
join the unjustified, court-imposed restriction on a
State's powei to administer its own affairs
The constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity, Justice Frankfurter explained, "finds its
explanation and justification
in avoiding the
potentialities of **1510 friction and furthering the
smooth operation of complicated governmental
machinery" Cit\ of Detioit v Mini ay Coip, 355
U S 489, 504, IS SCt 458, 491, 2 L Ed 2d 441
(1958) To protect the smooth operation of dual
governments in a federal system, it was at one time
thought necessaiy to prohibit state taxation of the
salaries of officers and employees of the United
States, Dobbins i Commissionei s of Eue County,
16 Pet 435, 10 L Ed 1022 (1842), as well as
federal taxation of the salaries of state officials
Collectoi v Day 11 Wall 113, 20 L Ed 122(1871)
The Court has since forsworn such "wooden
formalism " Washington v United States 460 U S
536, 544, 103 SCt 1344, 1349, 75 L Ed 2d 264
(1983)
The nondiscrimination rule recognizes the fact that
the Federal Government has no voice in the policy
decisions made by the several States The Federal
Government's protection against state taxation that
singles out fedenl agencies for special burdens is
therefore provided by the Supremacy Clause of the
Federal
Constitution,
the
doctrine
of
mteigovernmental tax immunity, and statutes such
as 4^USC § 111 [FN1] When the tax burden is
shared equally by federal agents and the vast
majority of a State's citizens, however, the
nondiscrimination principle is not applicable and
Copr © West 2003 No Claim

constitutional protection is not necessary As the
Court explained in United States v County oj
Fi esno

FN1 The legislative history of 4 U S C §
111 correctly describes the purpose of the
nondiscrimination principle as "[t]o protect
the Federal Government against the
unlikely possibility of State and local
taxation of compensation of Federal
officers and employees which is aimed at,
or threatens the efficient operation of, the
Federal Government" H R Rep No 26,
76th Cong, 1st Sess, 5 (1939), S Rep
No 112, 76th Cong , 1st Sess, 12 (1939)
*820 "The rule to be derived from the Court's
more recent decisions, then, is that the economic
burden on a federal function of a state tax
imposed on those who deal with the Federal
Government
does
not
render
the
tax
unconstitutional so long as the tax is imposed
equally on the other similarly
situated
constituents of the State This rule returns to the
original intent of M'CuUoch v Maiyland The
political check against abuse of the taxing power
found lacking m M'CuUoch, where the tax was
imposed solely on the Bank of the United States,
is present where the State imposes a
nondiscriminatory tax only on its constituents or
their artificially owned entities, and M'CuUoch
foresaw the unfairness in forcing a State to
exempt private individuals with beneficial
interests in federal property from taxes imposed
on similar interests held by others in private
property
Accordingly, M'CuUoch expressly
excluded from its rule a tax on 'the interest which
the citizens of Maryland may hold [in a federal
instrumentality] in common with other property
of the same description throughout the State' 4
Wheat, at 436 " 429 U S , at 462-464, 97 S Ct,
at 704-706 [FN2]

FN2 The quotation in the text omits one
footnote, but this footnote is relevant
"11 A tax on the income of federal
employees, or a tax on the possessory
interest
of
federal
employees
in
Government houses, if imposed only on
them, could be escalated by a State so as to
Orig U S Govt Works

109 SCt 1500
Page 11
103 L Ed 2d 891, 57 USLW 4389, 63 A F T R 2d 89-1174, 89-2 USTC P 9456, 10 Employee Benefits Cas 2097
(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500)
destioy the federal function performed by
them either by making the Federal
Government unable to hire anyone or by
causing the Federal Government to pay
prohibitively high salaries This danger
would never arise, howe\ei, if the tax is
also imposed on the income and property
interests of all other residents and voters of
the State " 429 U S , at 463, 97 S Ct, at
705
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the rationale of the nondiscrimination rule
is met when there is a political check
against excessive taxation See South
Caiohna \ Bakei 485 U S 505, 526, n
15, 108 SCt 1355, 1368, n 15, 99
LEd 2d 592 (1988) ("[T]he best safeguard
against excessive taxation (and the most
judicially manageable) is the requirement
that
the
government
tax
in
a
nondiscriminatory fashion For where a
government imposes a nondiscriminatory
tax, judges can term the tax 'excessive'
only by second-guessing the extent to
which the taxing government and its
people have taxed themselves, and the
threat of destroying another government
can be realized only if the taxing
government is willing to impose taxes that
will also destioy itself oi its constituents"),
Washington \ United States 460 U S
536, 545, 103 SCt 1344, 1350, 75
LEd 2d 264 (1983) ("A 'political check' is
provided when a state tax falls on a
significant gioup of state citizens who can
be counted upon to use their votes to keep
the State fiom raising the tax excessively,
and thus placing an unfair burden on the
Federal Government It has been thought
necessary because the United States does
not have a direct voice in the state
legislatures")
x

821 **1511 If Michigan were to tax the income of
federal employees without imposing a like tax on
others the tax would be plainly unconstitutional
Cf McCulloch \ Man land 4 Wheat 316,
425-437, 4 LEd 579 (1819) On the other hand, if
the State taxes the income of all its residents
equally, fedeial employees must pay the tax
Gia\es \ New )oik e\ lei O'Keefe 306 U S 466,

59 SCt 595, 83 LEd 927 (1939) See United
States \ County of Fiesno 429 U S , at 468, 97
S C t , at 707 (STEVENS, J, dissenting) The
Michigan tax here applies to approximately 4 1/2
million individual taxpayers in the State, including
the 24,000 retired federal employees It exempts
only the 130,000 retired state employees Tr of
Oral Arg 35-36 Once one understands the
underlying reason for the McCulloch holding, it is
plain that this tax does not unconstitutionally
discriminate against federal employees
The Court reaches the opposite result only by
examining whether the tax treatment of federal
employees is equal to that of one discrete group of
Michigan residents-retired state employees It
states "It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system
discriminates in favor of retired state employees and
against retired federal employees " Ante at 1507
But it does not necessarily follow that such a tax
"discriminate[s] against the [federal] officer or
employee because of the source of the pay or
compensation" 4 U S C § 111 The fact that a
State may elect to grant a pieference, or an
exemption, to a small percentage of its residents
does not make the tax discriminatory in any sense
that is relevant to the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity The obligation of a fedeial judge to
pay the same tax that is imposed on the *822
income of similarly situated citizens in the State
should not be affected by the fact that the State
might choose to grant an exemption to a few of its
taxpayers-whether they be state judges, other state
employees, or perhaps a select group of private
citizens Such an exemption might be granted "in
spite o f and not necessarily "because o f its
adverse effect on federal employees Cf Peisonnel
Admimsti atoi of Massachusetts v Feeney 442 U S
256, 279, 99 SCt 2282, 2296, 60 LEd 2d 870
(1979) Indeed, at least 14 other States grant
special tax exemptions for retirement income to
state and local government employees that they do
not grant to federal employees [FN3] As long as a
**1512 state *823 income tax draws no distinction
between the federal employees or retirees and the
vast majority of voters in the State, I see no reason
for concern about the kind of "discrimination" that
these provisions make The intergovernmental
immunity doctrine simply does not constitute a most
favored nation provision requiring the States to
accord federal employees and federal contractors
the greatest tax benefits that they give any other
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group subject to their jurisdiction.

FN3.
See
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann.
§§
43-1022(3) and (4) (Supp.1988) (benefits,
annuities, and pensions received from the
state retirement system, the state retirement
plan, the judges' retirement fund, the
public safety personnel retirement system,
or a county or city retirement plan exempt
in their entirety; income received from the
United States civil service retirement
system exempt only up to $2500);
Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-22- 104(4)(f) and (g)
(Supp.1988)
(amounts
received
as
pensions or annuities from any source
exempt up to $20,000 but amounts
received from Federal Government as
retirement pay by retired member of
Armed Forces less than 55 years of age
exempt only up to $2000); Ga.Code Ann. §
48-7-27(a)(4)(A) (Supp.1988) (income
from
employees'
retirement
system
exempt); La.Rev.Stat. §§ 42:545, 47:44.1
(West Supp.1989) (annuities, retirement
allowances and benefits paid under the
state employee retirement system exempt
from state or municipal taxation in their
entirety, but other annuities exempt only
up to $6000); Md.Tax- Gen.Code Ann. §
10-207(o ) (1988) (fire, rescue, or
ambulance personnel length of service
award funded by any county or municipal
corporation
of
State
exempt);
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 169.587 (Supp.1989)
(retirement allowance, benefit,
funds,
property, or rights under public school
retirement system exempt); Mont.Code
Ann. §§ 15-30-1 ll(2)(c)- (f) (1987)
(benefits under teachers retirement law,
public employees retirement system, and
highway patrol law exempt in their
entirety; benefits under Federal Employees
Retirement Act exempt only up to $3600);
N.Y.Tax Law § 612(c)(3) (McKinney
1987) (pensions to officers and employees
of State, its subdivisions and agencies
exempt); N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 105-141(b)(13)
and (14) (Supp.1988) (amounts received
from retirement and pension
funds
established
for
firemen
and
law
enforcement officers exempt in their

entirety, but amounts received from
federal-employee-retirement
program
exempt only up to $4000); Ore.Rev.Stat. §§
316.680(l)(c) and (d) (1987) (payments
from Public Employees Retirement Fund
exempt in their entirety, but payments
under public retirement system established
by United States exempt only up to
$5000); S.C.Code §§ 12-7-435(a), (d), (e)
(Supp.1988) (amounts received from state
retirement systems and retirement pay
received by police officers and firemen
from municipal or county retirement plans
exempt in their entirety; federal civil
service retirement annuity exempt only up
to $3000); Va.Code § 58.1-322(C)(3)
(Supp.1988)
(pensions
or retirement
income to officers or employees of
Commonwealth, its subdivisions and
agencies, or surviving spouses of such
officers or employees paid by the
Commonwealth
or
an
agency
or
subdivision thereof exempt); W.Va.Code §
§ ll-21-12(c)(5) and (6) (Supp.1988)
(annuities, retirement allowances, returns
of contributions or any other benefit
received under the public employees
retirement system, the department of
public safety death, disability, and
retirement fund, the state teachers'
retirement system, pensions and annuities
under any police or firemen's retirement
system exempt); Wis.Stat. § 71.05(l)(a)
(Supp.1988-1989)
(payments
received
from the employees' retirement system of
city of Milwaukee, Milwaukee city
employees' retirement system, sheriffs
retirement and benefit fund of Milwaukee,
firefighters' annuity and benefit fund of
Milwaukee, the public employee trust
fund, and the state teachers' retirement
system exempt).

To be sure, there is discrimination against federal
employees--and all other Michigan taxpayers—if a
small group of residents is granted an exemption.
If the size of the exempt group remains the
same—say, no more than 10% of the populace—the
burden on federal interests also remains the same,
regardless of how the exempt class is defined.
Whether it includes school teachers, church
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employees, state judges, or peihaps handicapped
peisons, is a matter of indifference to the Federal
Government as long as it can fairly be said that *824
federal employees are treated like other ordinary
residents of the State
Even if it were appropriate to determine the
discriminatory nature of a tax system by comparing
the treatment of federal employees with the
treatment of another discrete group of persons, it is
peculiarly inappropriate to focus solely on the
treatment of state governmental employees The
State may always compensate m pay or salary for
what it assesses in taxes Thus a special tax
imposed only on federal and state employees
nonetheless may reflect the type of disparate
treatment that the intergovernmental tax immunity
foibids because of the ability of the State to adjust
the compensation of its employees to avoid any
special tax buiden on them United States v
County ofFiesno 429 U S , at 468-469, 97 S Ct, at
707-708 (STEVENS, J, dissenting) It trivializes
the Supiemacy Clause to interpiet it as prohibiting
the States from pioviding through this limited tax
exemption what the State has an unquestionable
right to provide through inci eased retnement
benefits [FN4]

FN4 The Court also suggests that
compensating state employees through tax
exemptions rather than through increased
pension benefits disci lminates against
federal taxpayers by reducing the pension
income subject to federal taxation See
ante at 1507, n 4 But letired state
employees are not alone in receiving a
subsidy
through
a tax
exemption
Michigan, like most States, provides tax
exemptions to select industries and groups
See, e g
Mich Comp Laws Ann §
205 54a(g) (West 1986 and Supp 1988)
(industiial processing), and § 205 54a(p)
(1986) (pollution control) That the State
chooses to proceed by indirect subsidy
rathei than direct subsidy, however, should
not render the tax invalid under the
Supremacy Clause

Arguably, the Court's holding today is merely a
logical extension of our decisions in Phillips
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Chemical Co v Dumas Independent School Dist,
361 U S 376, 80 SCt 474, 4 L Ed 2d 384 (1960),
and Memphis Bank & Tiust Co v Ganiei, 459 U S
392, 103 SCt 692, 74 LEd2d 562 (1983)
**1513 Even if it were, I would disagree with it
Those cases are, however, significantly different
*825 Phillips involved a tax that applied only to
lessees of federal property Article 5248 of the
Texas Code imposed a tax on lessees of federal
lands measured by the value of the fee held by the
United States Article 7173 of the Code, the only
other provision that authorized a tax on lessees,
either granted an exemption to lessees of other
public lands or taxed them at a lower rate Lessees
of privately owned property paid no tax at all [FN5]
The company argued that "because Article 5248
applies only to private users of federal property, it is
invalid for that reason, without more " 361 U S , at
382, 80 S C t , at 478 The Court rejected that
argument, reasoning that it was "necessary to
determine how other taxpayers similaily situated are
treated" Id, at 383, 80 S C t , at 479 It then
defined the relevant classes of "similarly situated"
taxpayers as the federal lessees who were taxed
under Article 5248 and the lessees of other public
property taxed under Article 7173 Withm that
narrow focus, the Court rejected the school district's
argument that the discrimination between the two
classes could be justified Because the Court
confined its analysis to the two state taxes that
applied to lessees of public property, its reasoning
would be controlling in the case before us today if
Michigan's income tax applied only to public
employees, on that hypothesis, if state employees
were exempted, the tax would obviously
discriminate against federal employees

FN5 "Although Article 7173 is, in terms,
applicable to all lessees who hold
tax-exempt property under a lease for a
term of three years or more, it appears that
only lessees of public property fall within
this class in Texas Tax exemptions for
real
property
owned
by
private
organizations—chanties,
churches,
and
similar entities-do not survive a lease to a
business lessee The full value of the
leased property becomes taxable to the
owner, and the lessee's indirect burden
consequently is as heavy as the burden
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imposed directly on federal lessees by
Article 5248." 361 U.S., at 380-381, 80
S.Ct., at 477-478 (emphasis in original;
footnote omitted).

The troublesome aspect of the Court's opinion in
Phillips is its failure to attach any significance to
the fact that the tax on private landlords presumably
imposed an indirect burden on *826 their lessees
that was as heavy as the direct burden on federal
lessees imposed by Article 5248. The Court did
note that "[u]nder these circumstances, there
appears to be no discrimination between the
Government's lessees and lessees of private
property." Id., at 381, 80 S.Ct., at 478.
But-possibly because of the school district's rather
unwise reliance on an equal protection analysis of
the case [FN6]--the Court never even considered
the question whether the political check provided by
private property owners was sufficient to save that
tax from the claim that it singled out federal lessees
for an unconstitutional tax burden. [FN7]

FN6. "The School District addresses this
problem, essentially, as one of equal
protection, and argues that we must uphold
the classification,
though
apparently
discriminatory, 'if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it.' Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 528 [79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3
L.Ed.2d 480 (1959) ]." Id, 361 U.S., at
383, 80 S.Ct., at 479.
FN7. An interesting feature of the Phillips
opinion is its reference to the fact that the
tax upheld in United States v. City oj
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 78 S.Ct. 474, 2
L.Ed.2d 424 (1958), had actually included
an
exemption
for
school-owned
property-and
therefore
discriminated
"against" federal property in the same way
the tax involved in this case discriminates
"against" federal employees.
"This argument misconceives the scope of
the Michigan decisions. In those cases we
did not decide—in fact, we were not asked
to decide-whether the exemption of
school-owned property rendered the statute

discriminatory. Neither the Government
nor its lessees, to whom the statute was
applicable, claimed discrimination of this
character." Phillips Chemical Co. v.
Dumas Independent School Dist., 361
U.S., at 386, 80 S.Ct., at 480.
The Court's description of the relevant
class of property subject to tax in the
Detroit case obviously would have
provided the same political check against
discrimination regardless of how the
school
property
might
have
been
classified. In Detroit, Justice Black
described that class as follows:
"But here the tax applies to every private
party who uses exempt property in
Michigan in connection with a business
conducted for private gain. Under
Michigan law this means persons who use
property
owned
by
the
Federal
Government, the State, its political
subdivisions,
churches,
charitable
organizations and a great host of other
entities. The class defined is not an
arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory
one." 355 U.S., at 473, 78 S.Ct, at 478.

**1514 In Memphis Bank & Trust Co., the
question presented was the lawfulness of a
Tennessee tax on the net earnings of *827 banks
doing business in the State that defined net earnings
to "include interest received by the bank on the
obligations of the United States and its
instrumentalities, as well as interest on bonds and
other obligations of States other than Tennessee, but
[to] exclude interest on obligations of Tennessee
and its political subdivisions." 459 U.S., at 394,
103 S.Ct, at 694. Although the federal obligations
were part of a large class and the tax therefore did
not discriminate only against the income derived
from a federal source, all other members of the
disfavored class were also unrepresented in the
Tennessee Legislature. There was, therefore, no
political check to protect the out-of- state issuers,
including the federal instrumentalities, from
precisely the same kind of discrimination involved
in McCulloch v. Maryland. Indeed, in the
McCulloch case itself, the taxing statute did not, in
terms, single out the National Bank for disfavored
treatment; the tax was imposed on "all Banks, or
branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not
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chartered by the legislature:' 4 Wheat., at 317-318
. A tax that discriminates against a class of
nonresidents, including federal instrumentalities,
clearly is not protected by the political check that
saved the state taxes in cases like United States v.
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 97 S.Ct. 699, 50
L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), and City of Detroit v. Murray
Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 78 S.Ct. 458, 2 L.Ed.2d 441
(1958).
When the Court rejected the claim that a federal
employee's income is immune from state taxation in
Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
59 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 927 (1939), Justice
Frankfurter wrote separately to explain how a
"seductive cliche" had infected the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity, which had been
"moving in the realm of what Lincoln called
'pernicious abstractions.' " He correctly noted that
only a "web of unreality" could explain how the
"[f]ailure to exempt public functionaries from the
universal duties of citizenship to pay for the costs of
government was hypothetically transmuted into
hostile action of one government against the other."
Id, at 489-490, 59 S.Ct. at 603.
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for one of the disputed tax years, rather than statute
providing method for paying taxes under protest,
governed membership in class seeking refund for
state income taxes paid on federal retirement
income. U.C.A.1953, 59-1-301, 59-10-529.
[2] Taxation €==>986.1
371k986.1 Most Cited Cases
Federal military retirees are entitled to receive state
income tax exemption for their federal retirement
income. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111.
[3] Declaratory Judgment €=>214
118Ak214 Most Cited Cases

Federal retirees brought declaratory judgment
action against State Tax Commission seeking
refund of state income taxes paid on federal
retirement income. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, David S. Young, J., certified class,
entered partial summary judgment ordering refund,
and dismissed retirees' § 1983 claim. Commission
appealed, and retirees cross- appealed. Granting
interlocutory review, the Supreme Court, Howe,
Associate C.J., held that: (1) class certified was not
overly broad; (2) federal military retirees cannot be
required to pay state income tax on federal
retirement income; (3) retirees were not required to
exhaust administrative remedies; (4) state officials
were entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983
action; (5) retirees were not entitled to attorney
fees, costs of filing amended tax returns, or court
costs; and, on rehearing, held: (6) state statute
provided for refunds as remedy, and thus federal
retirees could not be denied that remedy, even
though it may not be required by federal due
process; and (7) issue of interest was not raised on
appeal, and thus, on rehearing, Supreme Court
would not consider applicability of legislation
limiting awards of interest which was enacted after
issuance of first opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Parties €^35.65
2S7k35.65 Most Cited Cases
Statute providing for refund of overpayment of
income taxes upon filing of amended return or
claim, in addition to statutory extension for filing

Federal retirees were not required to exhaust
administrative
remedies
prior
to
bringing
declaratory judgment action to determine their right
to refund of state income taxes paid on federal
retirement income; retirees raised legal questions
which could not have been finally determined by
Tax Commission in administrative proceeding, and
Commission was left with duty to challenge, audit,
and review amended returns and claims through its
administrative process, such that district court had
not
interfered
with core prerogatives of
Commission. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-14(2)(b)(ii).
[4] States €==>79
360k79 Most Cited Cases
State officials sued in their personal capacities may
assert personal immunity defenses such as
objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[5] Officers and Public Employees €^>H4
283kl 14 Most Cited Cases
Except under extraordinary circumstances, liability
will not attach for executing statutory duties one has
been appointed to perform. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[6] Civil Rights €^>1376(2)
78kl376(2) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k214(2))
Plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of
constitutional or statutory right may overcome
defendant officials' qualified immunity only by
showing that those rights were clearly established at
time of conduct at issue. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
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[7] Civil Rights €=^1376(3)
78kl376(3) Most Cited Cases
Agencies.
(Formerly 78k214(3))
Commissioners and director of State Tax
Commission were entitled to qualified immunity
from federal retirees' § 1983 claim that officials
failed to protect retirees' rights following United
States Supreme Court decision prohibiting state
taxation of federal retirement income; officials had
no power or authority to repeal state tax on federal
retirement income, and law regarding retroactivity
of Supreme Court's decision was not clearly
established at time of officials' actions. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.
[8] Taxation €^>1097
371kl097 Most Cited Cases
Prevailing taxpayers in suit for refund of state
income taxes were not entitled to award of attorney
fees and reimbursement for any costs incurred in
preparing and filing amended income tax returns,
where their § 1983 action had been dismissed. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[9] Taxation €=1097
371kl097 Most Cited Cases
Prevailing taxpayers in suit for refund of state
income taxes were not entitled to award of court
costs, absent statute authorizing such award. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 54.
110] Constitutional Law €=285.2
92k285.2 Most Cited Cases
[101 Taxation €=1102
371kl 102 Most Cited Cases
Even if federal due process did not require specific
remedy for illegal exaction of state taxes from
federal retirees, state statute provided for refunds as
remedy, and thus federal retirees could not be
denied that remedy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;
U.C.A. 1953,59-10-529.
[11] Taxation €^>1097
371kl097 Most Cited Cases
On rehearing in Tax Commission's appeal in
income tax refund case, Supreme Court would not

consider applicability of legislation limiting awards
of interest which was enacted after issuance of first
opinion, where no issue was raised on appeal
respecting award or rate of interest; however,
inasmuch as order appealed from was interlocutory
and case was being remanded to district court for
further proceedings, Commission was free to
present issue to that court for determination. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).
*797 Opinion On Rehearing
Jack C. Helgesen, Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for
Brumley.
R. Paul Van Dam, Arty. Gen., Leon A. Dever,
Brian L. Tarbet, John C. McCarrey, Asst. Attys.
Gen., Salt Lake City, for Tax Com'n.
Jan Graham, Arty. Gen., Carol Clawson, Sol. Gen.,
Reed Richards, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus
Governor Michael O. Leavitt.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
We granted this interlocutory appeal to review (1)
a partial summary judgment which ordered
defendant Utah State Tax Commission to refund to
all qualified persons and estates of deceased
persons all Utah state income tax paid by them on
retirement income from federal sources for the tax
years of 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988, together with
interest, court costs, and attorney fees, and (2) the
dismissal of plaintiffs' civil rights action.
On March 28, 1989, the United States Supreme
Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,
489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891
(1989), held that the constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity embodied in 4
U.S.C. § 111 required that the state of Michigan
treat federal and state retirement income the same
for state income tax purposes. Prior to that
decision, Michigan, as well as many other states
including Utah, allowed a tax exemption for state
retirement income but not for federal retirement
income. Shortly after that decision was announced,
plaintiffs filed this action for a declaratory judgment
in the district court against the State of Utah, the
Tax Commission, its commissioners, and its
director, seeking a refund of all taxes paid on
retirement income received from federal sources for
the tax years 1984 to and including 1988. On
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plaintiffs' motion, the court entered an order
certifying a class consisting of all federal retirees
and estates of deceased persons who paid Utah
State income tax on federal retirement income for
those years. Plaintiffs estimate that the class
consists of approximately 34,000 individuals and/or
estates. *798 One of the Commission's principal
defenses was that the decision in Davis should not
be applied retroactively to any tax year prior to
1989. Both plaintiffs and the Commission moved
for summary judgment. The district court denied
the Commission's motion and granted plaintiffs a
partial summary judgment, ordering that the
Commission refund state income tax paid by
qualified plaintiffs on retirement income from
federal sources for the years 1985 to 1988 inclusive.
The Commission appeals.
Subsequent to the briefing and oral argument of
this appeal, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case of Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation, 242 Va. 322, 410 S.E.2d
629 (1991), cert, granted, 504 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct.
1934, 118 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992), to determine
whether its decision in Davis should be applied
retroactively. Consequently, we have held the
instant appeal under advisement pending the
issuance of a decision in Harper. That decision
was rendered on June 18, 1993, 509 U.S. 86, 113
S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the Court
holding that its decision in Davis is to be applied
retroactively. The Harper decision moots one of
the Commission's principal defenses. However,
other defenses to the issuance of refunds to
plaintiffs have been raised, and we will proceed to
examine them.
OVERLY BROAD CLASS
[1] The Commission contends that the class
certified by the district court is overly broad. The
Commission supports this contention by first
arguing that the class should consist only of persons
who paid their income taxes for the years in
question under protest as provided for in Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-301 (1992) and brought suit for partial
refunds of taxes paid under protest within six
months thereafter as provided for in section
78-12-31. There is no merit to this contention.
Section 59-10-529, contained in our individual
income tax act, provides for the refund of any
"overpayment" of income taxes upon the filing of
an amended return or claim within three years of the

due date of the return. That section, rather than the
general provisions for the payment of taxes under
protest relied upon by Commission, is controlling
here.
The Utah Individual Income Tax Act of 1973, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 59-10-101 to -702 (1992),
incorporates by reference federal income tax law
and procedure into Utah income tax law. Section
59-10-529 was patterned after federal tax law and
provides for a refund of overpayments. The federal
definition of the word "overpayment" was at issue
in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 68
S.Ct. 229, 92 L.Ed. 142 (1947), when a taxpayer
brought suit to recover a payment of income tax
alleged to have been illegally assessed. The United
States Supreme Court defined tax "overpayment" to
include those tax payments made as a result of error
in law. The court wrote:
Hence we read the word "overpayment" in its
usual sense, as meaning any payment in excess of
that which is properly due. Such an excess
payment may be traced to an error in mathematics
or in judgment or in interpretation of facts or law.
And the error may be committed by the taxpayer
or by the revenue agents. Whatever the reason,
the payment of more than is rightfully due is what
characterizes an overpayment.
Id. at 531, 68 S.Ct. at 233. Two defendant
commissioners in their depositions concurred in that
definition. Moreover, after the decision in Davis
was announced, the legislature extended for an
additional year (to April 16, 1990) the three-year
limit for filing for refunds for the 1985 tax year.
1990 Utah Laws ch. 21, §§ 1-3 (effective February
21, 1990). Indeed, the Commission designed and
circulated a special simplified claim form to be used
by federal retirees to protect their rights in the event
that it was eventually determined that Utah must
refund taxes paid on their federal retirement income.
[2] The Commission next contends that the class
certified should not have included federal military
retirees as distinguished from federal civilian
retirees. The Commission argues that retired
military personnel receive current compensation for
reduced services rather than deferred compensation
for past services as is the case with civilian retirees.
Thus, the Commission asserts that *799 the Davis
decision does not apply to retirement income
received by military retirees since there is a
significant difference in the nature of the retirement
income received by the two types of retirees.
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This contention was fully answered by the United
States Supreme Court in its decision in Baikei v
Kansas 503 US 594, 112 S Ct 1619, 118 LEd2d
243 (1992), which was decided shortly after the
briefing and oral argument in the instant case
Baikei held that there are no significant differences
between military retirees and state and local
government retirees m terms of calculating
retirement benefits and thus military retirees are
entitled to the benefit of the Court's decision in
Davis
Finally, the Commission complains that the class
certified is defective because it includes taxpayers
who have claim:, for the 1984 tax year Plaintiffs
ha\e conceded that those persons cannot prevail,
and in the partial summary judgment, the
Commission was not ordered to pay refunds for
1984 but only for 1985 to 1988 inclusive On
remand of this case to the district court, the class
should be accordingly amended
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
[3] The Commission contends that the district court
erred in denying its motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint because plaintiffs had not exhausted their
admmistiative rc-medies The court's denial was
grounded on findings that (1) "requiring the
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies would
result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion,"
Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(n) (1989), (2)
there was no means to certify a class before the
Commission
and (3) the Commission had
pieliminanly decided that Daws did not mandate
refunds to plaintiffs We find no error Plaintiffs'
demands upon the Commission raised several legal
issues, namely, w hether the rule announced in Da\ is
should be applied retroactively and whether
plaintiffs weie required to have paid their taxes
under piotest and to have brought their actions for
refund within six months thereafter in the district
couit These legal questions could not have been
finally determined by the Commission in an
administrative proceeding
Therefore, it was
appiopnate for plaintiffs to file their action for a
declaratory judgment in the district court to obtain
rulings on the legal questions IML Fi eight v
Ottosen 538 P 2d 296 (Utah 1975), Walkei Bank
& Tnist Co \ Fay hi 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P 2d
592 (1964) See also Clayton \ Bennett 5 Utah 2d

152, 298 P2d 531 (1956), and Crystal Cat Line v
State Tax Commission 110 Utah 426, 174 P 2d 984
(1946), for additional examples of declaratory
judgment actions brought to determine legal
questions arising out of administrative proceedings
We recognize that in Johnson v Utah State
Retuement Office 621 P 2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980)
, we stated that the mere introduction of a
constitutional issue does not obviate the need for
exhaustion of administrative remedies
The
decision on other issues raised in the administrative
proceeding might render the constitutional question
moot, and thus the administrative remedy should be
pursued That scenario was not a realistic
possibility in the instant case The legal questions
involved are threshold questions, and their
determination could not have been avoided by any
turn the case might have taken m the Commission
Nor is this case like Union Pacific Raihoad v
Stntctma! Steel & Foige Co 9 Utah 2d 318, 344
P2d 157 (1959), where we stated that "m cases
raising issues of fact not within the comentional
experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise
of administrative discretion, the agencies created by
the legislative branch for regulating the subject
matter should first be heard" Id at 320, 344 P 2d
at 158
The district court, after deciding the legal issues
and concluding that refunds should be paid to class
members, properly left to the Commission the
responsibility of making the factual determinations
as to whether each class member has timely filed an
amended leturn or a claim and whether each
member has paid state income tax on federal
letirement income for the years in question This
leaves the Commission with the duty to challenge,
audit, and review amended returns and claims
through its administrative process Thus, the
district court has not interfered with the core
prerogatives of the Commission
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION
Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending that the district
court erred in dismissing their 42 U S C § 1983
civil rights action In their *800 complaint,
plaintiffs allege that their civil rights were violated
between March 28, 1989, when Davis was decided,
and April 17, 1989, which was the deadline for
filing 1988 Utah individual income tax returns It
is alleged that during this period, defendant
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commissioners and director (1) failed to inform
plaintiffs that no taxes would be due or collected on
income they leceived from federal retirement
sources during 1988, and (2) publicly announced
that Davis had no application in Utah, that Utah's
taxation scheme did not violate 4 U S C § 111, and
that plaintiffs need not file a claim for refund for the
1985 tax year by April 17, 1989 The district court
dismissed the action on the ground that defendant
officers enjoyed a qualified immunity
Plaintiffs concede that the state is not a "person"
under section 1983 and is not subject to a state
court claim for damages m a section 1983 action
Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police 491 U S 58,
71, 109 SCt 2304, 2311, 105 LEd2d 45 (1989)
Further, plaintiffs acknowledge that the Will court
held that a suit against state officials m their official
capacities is really a suit against the officials' offices
and is no different from a suit against the state
itself Howevei, plaintiffs argue that the state
officials can be sued in their individual capacities
and that under the circumstances presented by the
instant case, the officials enjoy no qualified
immunity
[4][5][6] We will assume for the purposes of this
case that 4 U S C § 111 confers on plaintiffs a right
the violation of which would be actionable against
the state officials in their individual capacities but
for the imposition of qualified immunity But see
Wiight v Roanoke Redev d. Housing 479 U S
418, 107 SCt 766, 93 LEd2d 781 (1987),
Segundo \ City of Rancho Muage 813 F 2d 1387,
1394 (9th Cn 1987) State officials sued in their
personal capacities may asseit personal immunity
defenses such as "objectively reasonable leliance on
existing law" Hafei \ Melo 502 U S 21, — , 112
SCt 358, 361, 116 L Ed 2d 301 (1991) (citing
Kentucky \ Giaham 473 U S 159, 105 SCt 3099,
87
LEd2d
114
(1985))
Except
under
extraordinary encumstances, liability will not attach
for executing the statutory duties one was appointed
to perform Lemon v Kwtzman 411 U S 192,
207-09, 93 SCt 1463, 1472-73, 36 L Ed 2d 151
(1973) Howevei, a plaintiff who seeks damages
for violation of a constitutional or statutory right
may overcome the defendant officials' qualified
immunity only by showing that those rights were
clearly established at the time of the conduct at
issue Hailow \ Fitzgeiald 457 U S 800, 818,
102 S Ct 2727, 2738, 73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982)

[7] Applying these principles to the instant case,
plaintiffs complain that during the twenty-day
period between the announcement of the decision in
Davis and the April 17, 1989 deadline for filing
Utah income tax returns for the 1988 tax year,
defendant officials failed to protect plaintiffs' rights
as earlier stated This contention, however,
overlooks the fact that defendant officials had no
power or authority to repeal Utah's tax on federal
retirement income Only the legislature could do
that The 1988 tax year concluded on December
31, 1988, and by March 28, 1989, many taxpayers
(including federal retirees) had already filed their
returns and paid tax on their retirement income
The legislature responded on September 19, 1989,
by making state retirement income as well as federal
letirement income taxable, effective January 1,
1989 1989 Utah Laws ch 7, Second Special
Session On February 21, 1990, the legislature
extended the three-year limit for filing for refunds
for the 1985 tax year for an additional year, to April
16, 1990 1990 Utah Laws ch 21 These
legislative responses were protective of plaintiffs'
rights Moreover, during that twenty-day period, it
was unclear whether Davis was to be applied
retroactively so as to entitle federal retirees to
refunds from the states where they had been taxed
Davis did not mandate refunds, let alone decide
whether refunds should be given for past years
Indeed, it was not until Haipei v Vnginia was
decided on June 18, 1993, that the retroactivity
issue was finally resolved
In Andeison v Oeighton 483 U S 635, 107 SCt
3034, 97 LEd2d 523 (1987), the Supreme Court
clearly stated
*801 The contours of the right [allegedly
violated] must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right This is not to say that
an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has
been previously held unlawful
but it is to say
that in the light of the pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent
Id at 640, 107 S Ct at 3039 Illustrative of this
principle is Swanson v Poweis 937 F 2d 965 (4th
Cir 1991), where the defendant, a former secretary
of revenue for the state of North Carolina, was held
to be entitled to qualified immunity for collecting
state income tax from federal retirees on their
retirement income prior to the announcement of the
decision in Davis The court stated that only
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violations of those federal rights clearly recognized
in existing case law will support an award in
damages under 42 U S C § 1983 The officials'
conduct in this case does not meet this high test
The perplexity of the problem facing the officials
during the twenty-day period in attempting to
determine whether the Davis decision should be
applied retroactively is best demonstrated by the
case of Duffy \ Wetzlei, 174 A D 2d 253, 579
N Y S 2 d 684 (N Y App Div 1992) There, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, after an exhaustive analysis of United States
Supreme Court decisions on the subject of
retroactivity, held on January 15, 1992, that the
decision m Davis should not be applied
retroactively so as to entitle federal retirees in New
York State to a refund The Virginia Supreme
Court reached a similar result in Haipei v Vugima,
242 Va 322, 410 S E 2d 629 (1991) These cases,
of course, reached the exact opposite conclusion on
retroactivity than the United States Supreme Court
leached in Haipei v Vugima more than one year
later Because the constitutional rights in question
were not "clearly established" during the twenty-day
period, we find no error in the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' ci\il rights action on the
ground of qualified immunity
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
[8] The district court awarded plaintiffs attorney
fees and leimbursement for any cost they may incur
in piepanng and filing amended income tax returns
Plaintiffs find support for those awards only in a
successful 42 U S C § 1983 civil rights action
Inasmuch as we have held that their civil rights
action was propeily dismissed, the award of
attorney fees and the cost of return preparation
cannot stand That part of the summary judgment
is reveised
[9] Neither can the award of court costs to
plaintiffs stand Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, states in part, "Costs against the state of
Utah, its officeis, and agencies shall be imposed
only to the extent permitted by law" Plaintiffs
ha\e cited no statute which would authorize the
award of costs in this case
CONCLUSION
We ha\e considered othei assignments of en or
made by defendants and find them lacking in merit

The partial summary judgment is affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
district court for further pioceedings consistent with
this opinion

HALL, C J , ZIMMERMAN, J, and BILLINGS,
Court of Appeals J , concur
STEWART, J, having disqualified himself, does
not participate herein

BILLINGS, Court of Appeals J , sat
DURHAM, J, having disqualified herself, does not
participate herein
On Petition for Rehearing
HOWE, Justice
The Utah State Tax Commission filed a petition for
rehearing in this case, Bi umley v State Tax Comm 'n,
868 P2d 796 (Utah 1993), and the Honorable
Michael O Leavitt, Governor of Utah, has filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of that petition The
petition raises three questions which we address
[10] First, petitioner assails our failure m our
opinion to address petitioner's contention that state
law satisfied all federal due process requirements by
providing federal retirees, *802 prior to their
payment of any taxes for the years in question, the
opportunity to challenge the legality of the
exemption for state retirees We did not address
that contention because even if it is true, it is not
dispositive The legislature in Utah Code Ann §
59-10-529 granted direct relief to taxpayers who
overpay by providing for refunds of overpayments
It is true that Haipei v Vugima Depaitment oj
Taxation, 509 U S 86, — , 113 S Ct 2510, 2520,
125 LEd2d 74, 89 (1993), gave the states latitude
to craft a remedy for the illegal exaction of taxes
In Utah, however, the nature of the remedy was not
an open question The legislature had long since
provided refunds as the remedy Plaintiffs cannot be
denied that remedy even though it may not be
required by federal due process Cases cited by
petitioner and amicus where refunds were not
required as a matter of state law are therefore
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distinguishable. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 241 Va. 232, 401 S.E.2d 868, 873 (1991)
; Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625, 422 S.E.2d 846,
849 (1992), on remand from U.S. Sup.Ct., 263 Ga.
602, 437 S.E.2d 320 (1993).
Second, petitioner requests that we clarify an
ambiguity in our opinion wherein we stated;
The district court ... properly left to the
Commission the responsibility of making the
factual determinations as to whether each class
member has timely filed an amended return or a
claim....
Brumley, 868 P.2d at 799. That statement is in
error. The Tax Commission admitted in its answer
to the complaint that the class members had timely
filed. The trial court ordered refunds to be paid to
all members of the class. No challenge was raised
on appeal to any lack of filing or the timeliness of
filing. Therefore, we amend our opinion by
striking the statement that the Commission should
determine whether each class member timely filed
an amended return oi a claim

BILI INGS, Court of Appeals Judge, concur.

STEWART, Associate C.J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein; Bfl.! IV :vv
Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

DURHAM. J... h a \ i n g cl i s qu a 1 ifie d h e r s e 1 f, d o e s n o t
participate herein.

i

868 P.2d 796
ENDOElHK'T'MENfT

- IL di ^:i K* ct'Uil i--* J- i<:d iclund>
together with interest thereon at the rate of "12
percent per annum in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 59-10-538, 1987 as amended," No issue
was raised on appeal respecting the award or the
rate of interest. After our opinion was handed
down, the legislature, in special session, enacted a
statute which petitioner argues limits the award of
interest to 6 percent per annum. H.B. 7, 2d Spec.
Sess. (1993).
In accordance with our long-standing practice of
refusing to consider issues raised for the first time
on rehearing, we decline to decide whether this new
legislation can be lawfully applied in the instant
case. However, inasmuch as the order appealed
from is interlocutory and the case is being remanded
to the district court for further proceedings,
petitioner is free to present this issue to that court
nv- its determination Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). This
' *.- tion comports with our limited function as an
..•[•. Hate court to review orders and judgments
made b\ the liia! conn- in the fust insi.nu :.
• . i \u-- tor ichearing is denied, and the
opimoi is amended as indicated abo\e

ZIMMER M VN, C.J

II s II

J , i in. I J I JDITH M.
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T H I R D DISTRICT C O U R T , STATE O F UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT L A K E D E P A R T M E N T
R I C H A R D C. T H O M P S O N e t . a l . ,
)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs .

Case No. 010911230

UTAH STATE T A X COMMISSION,
e L,

Judge Ronald E. Nehring

di. ,

Defendants,
I h i s ma 11 e r c ame be f o re 11 i« E • C Di i r !:: f o r o r a 1 a r g u m e n t on
A u g u s t 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , p u r s u a n t to 11 ie M o t i o n to Dismiss o f t h e Utab
S t a t e T a x C o mm i s s i o n D e f e n d a i I t s

01 i A i i :j i s 1: 2 3

2002

e n t e r e d an O r d e r joining the S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t B o a r d .

Subsequent

to that. o r d e r , P] a :i n 1: :i ffs , T a: c C< : >mmi ss:i ( :)i I D e f e n d a n t s
S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t Board a g r e e d on. a s c h e d u l e a n d filed

11 i e C • : • I i j : c:

ai id 11 I 2

memoranda

to s u p p l e m e n t t h e M o t i < :)r I I : D:i sin i s s t h a t w a s h e a r i c i I / . : . *

2002.

Plaintiffs were represented by Gary Dodge, Kevin W. Bates,

and Mark R. Clements of the law firm of Hatch, James and Dodge.
The Tax Commission was represented by John C. McCarrey and
Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorneys General.

The Utah State

Retirement Board was represented by Kevin A. Howard, Gregory D.
Phillips, Daniel D. Andersen, and David B. Hansen of the lav; firm
Howard, Phillips and Andersen.
The State Retirement Board joined in the pending Motion to
Dismiss.

After reviewing the supplemental pleadings, the Court

concluded that the oral argument held on August 20, 2002, was
sufficient and that further oral argument would not aid the Court
in its decision.
Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties submitted prior
to the hearing, and having reviewed the subsequent pleadings
filed by Plaintiffs, the Tax Commission Defendants, and the Utah
State Retirement Board, this case is dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(B)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons

stated below, I grant Defendants' motion.
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable,
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state

2

ill J h > >. > l<i ..mi. , -I1.' 1

r e t i r e e s by 3 i

1 i 1'' .-^ i .

I l a m t i i i"s,

r e t i r e e s who were e m p l o y e d b y the federal government,, cha] lerige
11 i e s t a t e' s :i e c i s i o i i 1: • : • i i i c r e a s e p e i i s i o i I b e i I e f i t s t o s t a t e
r e t i r e e s , c l a i m i n g that the b e n e f i t s are m e r e l y a replacement; for
t: h e J : s t: t a x e x enip t i o i i a i i d e s s e r I t i a 1J \, c c i I s t :i t I 11 e t a x r e b a t e s I. o
State retirees.
A f u 3 1 i 11 I d e r s t a n ci i i i g c: • f 11 I e n a 11 i r e • : f P1 a i n t i f f s' :: ] a i n i s
r e q u i r e s an 1: listorical e x p l a n a t i o n .

Prior to 1989; 21 states

e x e m p t e d r e c i p i e n t s of s t a t e reti remei I 1: bei ief:i t: s f r c -i :: i :i i icome tax
w h i l e i m p o s i n g i n c o m e t a x on tt le b e n e f i t s of federal r e t i r e e s .
In 1989; the U n i t e s S t a t e S u p r e m e Court e n d e d thj s practi ce,
f i n o i n g that i t c o n s t i t u t e d u n l a w f u l tax discriminatior I ir I
v i o l a t i o n of f e d e r a l lav/ and the d o c t r i n e of
tax i m m u n i t y .

intergovernmental

Davis v. M i c h i g a n , 489 U . S . 803

(1989).

U t a h , 11ke m a n y s i s t e r s t a t e s , r e s p o n d e d to the Supreme
C • : • i :i i !::.' s e d i c t b y a i i: le i i d i n g i t s s t a t u t e t o ma ke state retirement
benefits taxable.

The l e g i s l a t u r e also i n c r e a s e d p e n s i o n

b e n e f :i i s t : ; 31 : a t e r e t i r e e s b y 3 1
(1998).

I J t c 11 C : : 1 :: i

:i

It is u n d i s p u t e d t h a t the i n c r e a s e in r e t i r e m e n t

fc > e 1 1 e f :i t s 1 a r g e J y o f f s e t s 11: 1 = a 1 1 :) 1
i n d i v i d u a l Utah r e t i r e e w o u l d be r e q u i r e d to p a y .
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Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits
because of the rebate.
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar
challenges to legislative responses to Davis.

See, Sheehv v.

Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786
(Mont. 1993), Raasdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348
(Or. 1995), Voal v. Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or.
1997), Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir..
429 (2000) cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 202 (Mem.) (2001) .

Irrespective

of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis Court did not
foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond
to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its retirees.
Those cases which invalidated, as violative of Davis, increases
in state retiree benefits, did so only because the benefit
increases incorporated additional provisions which made
transparent the true and improper nature of the response—
creating a tax rebate.
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I

and content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann.

§ 49-1-701

(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by
lawful means the result which the Davis Court found to be
impermissibly discriminatory.

The timing and intent of the

legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling.

Of

primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product
of the legislature's response to Davis.

The statute itself

applies to all members whose retirement allowance was previously
exempt from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has "subsequently
become subject to the tax.''

Specifically, a member shall

receive:
(a)

(b)

(c)

rhe administrator shall calculate the member's
retirement allowance pursuant to the formula
governing the system from which the member
retired;
the administrator shall then increase the
allowance calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by
3%; and
the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection
(2) (b) is the new basis upon which any future
adjustments to benefits are made.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701

(2002) 1 .

Additionally, under subsection
(a)

(6)

[t]he retirement board shall annually certify the

1

The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered
this section, formerly referred to as Section 49-1-701.
6

(>>)

contribution rate necessary for each system to
comply with this section and may adopt rules to
a dm. i n i s t e r t h i s sec t i o n .
[t]his c o n t r i b u t i o n r a t e s h a l l be r e p o r t e d
separately from the total contribution rate
necessary to fund the systems on an actuarially
sound basis and may not be used in comparative
studies of public employee benefits.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701
l

(2002).

* c J o s e J o :> 1 : a t t: i :t e s e s t a 11 11 o r y p r o z i s i o n s i n d i c a t e s 11 I a t

the l a n g u a g e b e t r a y s no d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n t e n t .

F i r s t , the 3%

a d j u s t m e n t i s g i ~ 7 e i I t :> a ! ] r: e t: i r e e s w 1 I c • w a r e i :: ienib e i s o f z h e
system.

T h e r e is n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n retirees located j n t h e

s t a t e o f [ 11 a h a n d 11 I :> S e ! o c a t e d • : i 11 o f s 1: a t e .

E s s e i 11 i a 11 y , e " e r y

e l i g i b l e r e t i r e e w h o r e t i r e d on or a f t e r January 1,

1989,

r e c e i v e d the 3^ i n c ^ p - ^ (1998).

MI -m I'ccle ^nn

r

>]-^- 1 ~ < n [ i i i

Second, the statute itself evidences no attempt to

coordinate the 3% benefit with the i ncome tax rates or szri ic11 Ire
as found under Utah Code Ann.,. Title 59.

Finally, distinguishing

itself from Sheehv, the plain language shows that the legislature
does

,iv! the i-s adjustment via direct legislative

appropriation of tax dollars to eligible retirees.

I i 11 ]

§ 1 9 ] ; 0 ] (• 5;

; ] $• 9 8 )

Utah Code

I J11 i m a t e 1 ;;y , 11: 1 e total cost, i s

r e c o g n i z e d as a d i r e c t p a r t o f t h e t o t a l e m p l o y e e s '
package.
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compensation

This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis Court's
clear anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through
its holding, warrants the conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims must
fail as a matter of law, and Defendants' motion is hereby
granted.
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other
arguments advanced by Defendants in aid of their motion.

Hatch, James & Dodge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Howard, Philrips & Andersen
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement
Board
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CERTIFICATE OE ' SERV ICE
I hereby certify that on the

, ^

day of

2003, I caused a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMXSSA"
mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Gary Dodge
Kevin W. Bates
Mark R. Clements
Hatch James & Dodge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4101
John C. McCarrey
Timothy A. Bodily
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Defendants
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
PO Box 140874
Salt lake City, Utah 84114-0874
Kevin A. Howard
Howard Phillips & Andersen
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Retirement Board
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 481 02
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

I

day of May, 2003, I

caused a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to be hand
delivered to:

Gary Dodge
Kevin W. Bates
Mark R. Clements
Hatcn James & Dodge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Kevin A. howard
Howard Phillips & Andersen
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Pemrement Board
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 48102
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